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When Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968,1 it sought to provide law enforcement
with a much-needed weapon in the fight against organized crime2
while protecting the privacy of oral and wire communications.3 In
so doing the Legislature also attempted to satisfy the procedural
* Executive Assistant District Attorney, New York City Special Narcotics Prosecutor's
Office; A.B., University of Rochester, 1966; J.D., Columbia University, 1969.
' 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2 S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 70, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2112, 2157 [hereinafter cited as S. REP., U.S. CODE CONG.].
S. REp., supra note 2, at 66, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. at 2153.
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and substantive requirements discussed in Berger v. New York' and
Katz v. United States5 by delineating "on a uniform basis the cir-
cumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and
oral communications may be authorized."' Thus, Title III describes
in detail who may apply to which courts for authorization to inter-
cept oral or wire communications,7 what the application and order
must contain,8 what crimes may be investigated by means of court-
authorized eavesdropping,9 the circumstances under which evidence
obtained through eavesdropping may be utilized, 0 and the manner
in which tapes used to record intercepted conversations are to be
sealed and preserved."
These procedural and substantive provisions, however, were
made expressly inapplicable to a number of activities. 2 The most
important of the exempted activities is consensual interception or
eavesdropping:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting
under color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication, where
such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties
to the communication has given prior consent to such intercep-
tion. 13
388 U.S. 41 (1967). The Berger Court, in the context of nonconsensual eavesdropping,
delineated certain procedural and substantive safeguards which are constitutional prerequis-
ites to the issuance of an electronic surveillance warrant: (1) There must be probable cause
to believe that a particular offense has been or is being committed; (2) the conversations to
be intercepted must be particularly described; (3) the eavesdrop must be for a specific and
limited period of time to minimize the intrusion; (4) present probable cause must be shown
for the continuance or renewal of the eavesdrop; (5) the eavesdropping must terminate once
the evidence sought has been seized; (6) there must be notice unless a showing of exigency
based on the existence of special facts is made; and (7) there must be a return on the warrant
so that the court may supervise and restrict the use of the seized conversations. Id. at 54-60;
see S. REP., supra note 2, at 74, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. at 2161-62.
389 U.S. 347 (1967). For a discussion of the effect of Berger and Katz on prior law, see
Dash, Katz - Variations on a Theme by Berger, 17 CAT. U.L. REv. 296 (1968).
S. REP., supra note 2, at 66, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. at 2153.
18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
x Id. § 2518 (1970).
1 Id. § 2516(1)(a)-(g) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
,0 Id. § 2517 (1970).
Id. § 2518(8).
12 See Id. § 2511(2)-(3). The Congress exempted certain activities of switchboard opera-
tors and employees of communications common carriers and the Federal Communications
Commission. Id. § 2511(2)(a)-(b). In addition, consensual interceptions by persons acting
under color of law and private citizens who are not eavesdropping in furtherance of criminal
or tortious conduct are also exempted. Id. § 2511(2)(c)-(d). Finally, the constitutional power
of the President to protect the nation was not intended to be restricted by Title III. Id. §
2511(3); see S. REP., supra note 2, at 94, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. at 2182.
13 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1970). "Intercept" is defined as "the aural acquisition of the
contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical,
TITLE III
This provision was intended to, and did, "largely reflect existing
law."' 4 "Existing law," however in 1968 was, and until quite recently
continued to be, in a state of flux. Despite the statutory exception
for consensual interceptions, courts struggled with the more funda-
mental question: Does such activity fall within the search and sei-
zure and warrant provisions of the fourth amendment?
This Article will discuss, in turn, the "existing law" which Con-
gress sought to "reflect" in 1968, constitutional developments in
that law since 1968, and several legal and practical questions that
either existed prior to or have developed since the enactment of
Title II1 concerning consensual and other interceptions of communi-
cations without a court order.'5
TITLE Il: EXISTING LAW AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Supreme Court first squarely faced the question of whether
the fourth amendment requires a warrant for a consensual intercep-
tion in On Lee v. United States. '6 There, a government informant
twice wore a transmitter while discussing with the defendant a crim-
inal conspiracy to distribute opium.' 7 At trial, an agent of the Nar-
or other device." Id. § 2510(4). Title I expressly permits the use of such intercepted commu-
nications in court:
Any person who has received, by any means authorized by this chapter, any infor-
mation concerning a wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom
intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter may disclose the
contents of that communication or such derivative evidence while giving testimony
under oath or affirmation in any criminal proceeding in any court of the United
States or of any State or in any Federal or State grand jury proceeding.
18 U.S.C. § 2517(3) (1970).
" S. REP., supra note 2, at 93-94, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. at 2182.
This Article will not discuss in detail eavesdropping under the national security provi-
sions of Title m, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970), nor under the emergency provisions of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(7) (1970).
, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
" The conversations occurred several weeks after the defendant's arrest and while he was
free on bail. 343 U.S. at 748-49. This fact did not enter in the Court's decision, which was
rendered 12 years prior to Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). In Massiah. the
defendant, who had been arraigned on narcotics charges and released on bail, discussed his
pending case with his codefendant. Federal officials, with the codefendant's consent, moni-
tored the conversations. The Court, not reaching the fourth amendment issue, held that the
government's deliberate elicitation of postindictment statements violated the defendant's
right to counsel and excluded the testimony concerning the overheard conversations. Id. at
206-07. If the facts in On Lee were before the Court today, in all likelihood the monitored
conversations would be supressed on sixth amendment grounds. See Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427, 444 n.1 (1963) (Warren, C.J., concurring); Comment, Eavesdropping. Informers
and the Right of Privacy: A Judicial Tightrope, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 975, 984 & n.69 (1967).
There has been considerable litigation concerning the point at which law enforcement
officials must terminate consensual investigative contact with a defendant. The Supreme
1976l
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cotics Bureau who had monitored the conversations described the
admissions the defendant had made to the informant. The Court
held that eavesdropping with the consent of one of the participants
is not an unreasonable search and seizure and that the agent's testi-
mony was, therefore, properly admitted at trial.'
In Lopez v. United States,'9 an agent of the Internal Revenue
Service used a wire recorder to record a meeting at which the defen-
Court dealt with this issue in a noneavesdropping context in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293 (1966). While on trial for violations of the Taft-Hartley Act, Hoffa and others discussed,
in the presence of a government informer, their efforts to bribe members of the jury. Subse-
quently, Hoffa and several others were indicted for jury tampering. At the trial of these new
charges the informer was permitted to testify, over objection, to the conversations he had sat
in on. The Court, assuming that the jury-tampering conversations were deliberately over-
heard at government instigation and in the absence of counsel, held that the conversations
were admissible since they did not relate to the then current trial but to the altogether
different crime of jury tampering. Id. at 308. See also Vinyard v. United States, 335 F.2d 176
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 930 (1964). Similarly, in United States v. Osser, 483 F.2d
727, 733-34 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1028 (1973), the defendant's indictment for and
arraignment on contract-rigging charges was held not o preclude use of consensual electronic
surveillance to gather evidence of the defendant's subsequent attempts to suborn perjury.
Significantly, Hoffa, Vinyard, and Osser all involved crimes committed after the original
charges had been brought. In each, the contested evidence was introduced at the trial of the
new, not the original, charges. Where the consensually overheard or intercepted conversations
relate to already pending charges or are offered at the trial of those charges, they have been
excluded. See United States v. Frank, 520 F.2d 1287 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1087 (1976). The Frank court also indicated that evidence of conversations relating to both
pending and new charges "might possibly [be] admitted" at a separate trial of the new
charges. 520 F.2d at 1291; see United States v. Merritts, 387 F. Supp. 807 (E.D. Ill.), rev'd
in part, 527 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1975).
If a defendant has not yet been formally charged with a crime, law enforcement officials
may conduct consensual surveillance of his conversations even though they are on notice that
he is represented by counsel, United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974); United States v. DiLorenzo, 429 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950 (1971), and may under some circumstances consensually monitor
conversations to which defense counsel is a party, id.; United States v. Gartner, 518 F.2d 633,
637-38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 915 (1975); People v. Holman, 78 Misc. 2d 613, 356
N.Y.S.2d 958 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1974). Once a defendant has been formally charged, the
fact that he is not maintained in custody would be irrelevant. Cf. Pitler, "The Fruit of the
Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALF. L. Rav. 579, 613-14 (1968). In addition,
it should be made clear that a significant number of questions are still present in the law.
Among the unresolved problems are: (1) which principle, Massiah or Hofla, applies if the
"new" crime is not a different offense, but merely a continuation of the same criminal
scheme, e.g., the continuation of a conspiracy to murder after indictment on that charge; (2)
which principle is applicable when the "new" crime is merely a repetition of the old, e.g..
the continued sale of narcotics after indictment for previous sales; (3) which principle applies
when the indictment has been sealed pending further investigation; and (4) which principle
applies if the information sought concerns a crime committed prior to the crime for which
the defendant is under indictment. Definitive answers to these questions must await further
judicial consideration.
343 U.S. at 754, 757-58.
373 U.S. 427 (1963).
TITLE III
dant, Lopez, offered him a bribe. The defendant argued, inter alia,
that his conversations had been seized in contravention of his fourth
amendment rights and thus both the agent's testimony and the
recording should have been suppressed. Rejecting this contention,
the Court stated that, in fact, there had been no governmental
eavesdropping in the case, and held that the recording and testi-
mony had been properly admitted at trial.'"
Both On Lee and Lopez were based, at least in part, on the
then-accepted theory that fourth amendment rights were not vio-
lated unless there was a physical trespass into a "constitutionally
protected area."12' This concept was laid to rest in Katz v. United
States. 22 In Katz, the government attached a listening and recording
device to the outside of a public telephone booth. Through this
device FBI agents overheard the defendant's half of his phone con-
versations and then testified at trial to what he had said. Neither
Katz nor the person with whom he had spoken had consented to
either the use of the device or the overhearing, recording, or divulg-
ing of Katz' statements. Both the defendant and the prosecution
saw the issue as whether a public phone booth was a "constitution-
ally protected area" and whether physical penetration into such an
area was necessary before the fourth amendment's search and sei-
zure and warrant provisions would apply.23
The Court, per Justice Stewart, "[declined] to adopt this for-
mulation of the issues. '" 2 Noting that "we have expressly held that
the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible
items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements over-
heard, without any 'technical trespass under . . . local property
law,' "2 and that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not sim-
ply 'areas,' ",26 the Court ruled that "[t]he Government's activities
. . .violated the privacy upon which [the petitioner] justifiably
relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a
'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. 12 7 The Court suppressed the "seized" oral statements not
because use of an electronic device is inherently unconstitutional,
'0 Id. at 438-40.
28 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), overruled. United States
v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
" 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
' Id. at 349-50.
2 Id. at 350.
Id. at 353, citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
21 389 U.S. at 353.
v Id.
19761
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but rather because the failure to obtain prior judicial authorization
for surveillance in the circumstances presented by Katz violated the
requirements of the fourth amendment. 28
Significantly, the applicability of a warrant requirement to the
monitoring or recording of a suspect's statements when a partici-
pant to the conversation consents to such activity was not specifi-
cally dealt with in Katz. True, early in his opinion, Justice Stewart
wrote: "[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. 129
This, by itself, would indicate that On Lee and Lopez remained
good law. The very next sentence of the opinion, however, reads:
"But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected." '' Certainly a
criminal conspirator "seeks to protect as private" inculpatory state-
ments which he makes to one whom he erroneously believes to be a
co-conspirator. The informant or agent carrying the concealed
transmitter or recorder might consent to the use of such devices; but
is his consent sufficient? Or, is the consent of the suspect himself
required before his words can be "seized" without a warrant by
electronic or mechanical means?"
As a result of these unanswered questions, the "existing law"
governing the use of consensual surveillance remained unclear in
1968 when Congress enacted Title III and exempted interceptions
with the consent of a participant from its provisions 2 Nonetheless,
Id. at 356-57. Although the Katz Court stated that the fourth amendment focuses on
"people-and not simply 'areas,'" and that "the presence or absence of a physical intrusion
into any given enclosure" is not the critical consideration in determining the existence of an
illegal search and seizure, id. at 353, the continuing importance of an individual's "right to
be secure in [hisl house" was reemphasized in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165
(1969). Reasoning that Katz "was [not] intended to withdraw any of the protection which
the Amendment extends to the home," id. at 180, the Alderman Court found that the owner
of premises has standing to object to the admission of evidence obtained by the government
through illegal electronic surveillance conducted on his premises regardless of whether the
owner was a party to the monitored conversations. For a discussion of Alderman, see notes
76-83 and accompanying text infra.
389 U.S. at 351.
"Id.
" The Katz Court noted that "the very nature of electronic surveillance precludes its use
pursuant to the suspect's consent." Id. at 358 (emphasis added).
11 There appears to have been little debate in Congress over the constitutionality of the
exemption for consensual interception contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2551(2)(c) (1970) in light of
Katz, although some concern was expressed over the general constitutionality of Title UI in
light of both Berger and Katz. See 114 CONG. Rc. 14,158-61, 14,167 (remarks of Sens. Hart
and Long). For an excellent discussion of the state of the law in 1968, see Greenawalt, The
[Vol. 51:41
TITLE III
in United States v. White,3 3 a case which arose prior to, but was
decided after the enactment of Title III, a majority of the Court
agreed with Congress' conclusion that consensual electronic eaves-
dropping is not an unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth
amendment.
In White, an informant had worn a transmitting device on eight
occasions while conversing with the defendant about narcotics. At
trial, the Government could not locate or produce the informant,
and called as witnesses federal agents, who were allowed, over objec-
tion, to testify to the conversations they had electronically over-
heard. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
interpreting Katz as overruling On Lee, reversed the defendant's
conviction and suppressed the testimony concerning the overheard
conversations.3 4 Disagreeing with this conclusion, the Supreme
Court ruled that the agents' testimony had been properly admitted
at trial. It did so, however, with a plethora of opinions, a variety of
theories, and by the narrowest of margins.
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, and Black-
mun declared that On Lee and Lopez were both still good law.:"
Noting the absence of a consenting party in Katz, Justice White,
writing the plurality opinion, rejected the contention that Katz may
have recognized a "constitutionally protected expectation that a
person with whom [the defendant] is conversing will not then or
later reveal the conversation to the police. '36 Since there is no signif-
icant difference between participant revelation by subsequent re-
porting to the police and participant revelation by transmission or
recording, the plurality concluded that the use of electronic equip-
ment would not transform otherwise constitutional investigative
techniques into an unreasonable search and seizure..37 As an alterna-
tive ground for reversal, Justice White adhered to an earlier decision
that Katz would only be applied prospectively." Thus, according to
Consent Problem in Wiretapping & Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitoring with the Con-
sent of a Participant in a Conversation, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 189 (1968).
401 U.S. 745 (1971).
31 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). In White, the Seventh Circuit
had held that Lopez, which dealt with a concealed tape recorder, was undisturbed by Katz,
but that On Lee, which dealt with a concealed transmitter, was overruled by Katz. 405 F.2d
at 847. See also note 45 infra.
See 401 U.S. at 753-54.
" Id. at 749. As Justice White noted, the Court had previously held that the fourth
amendment does not protect "a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he
voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it." Id., quoting Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
:0 401 U.S. at 751.
Id. at 754, citing Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
1976]
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the plurality, the Seventh Circuit had not only interpreted Katz
incorrectly, but had also applied it incorrectly.
Justice Black concurred in the result, based on his dissent in
Katz, wherein he had opined that only tangible items not conversa-
tions, were protected by the fourth amendment." Justice Brennan,
also concurring in the result, agreed that Katz should only be ap-
plied prospectively.'" Nevertheless, Justice Brennan went on to
state that in his opinion, "the Fourth Amendment imposes the war-
rant requirement in both the On Lee and the Lopez situations."',
Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Marshall, in separate dissents,
rejected the notion that Katz should only provide prospective relief,
and agreed that On Lee was no longer viable since, in their view,
the fourth amendment requires prior judicial authorization for
third-party monitoring of a conversation even if done with the con-
sent of one of the participants. 2 The dissenting Justices, however,
did not agree on the continued authority of Lopez. Justice Douglas
argued that both On Lee and Lopez had been discredited by subse-
quent decisions of the Court.4 3 Justice Harlan distinguished On Lee
and White, describing them as "third party bugging,"4 from Lopez,
in which he found an absence of "third party intrusion" and thus
no fourth amendment search and seizure.15 Justice Marshall, while
agreeing that On Lee should be overruled," did not give any specific
indication of his thinking concerning a situation involving a con-
cealed recorder rather than a transmitter.
As a result of this six-opinion division and despite the holding
of a majority of the White Court that consensual electronic eaves-
" 401 U.S. at 754 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black's dissent in Katz is reported in
389 U.S. at 364.
" 401 U.S. at 755 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 756.
12 Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 768 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 795 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). In addition to disagreeing with the decision in Desist v. United States, 394
U.S. 244 (1969)-that Katz should only provide prospective relief-Justice Harlan stated that
White was even more troublesome than Desist since general fourth amendment principles,
not the Katz decision itself, controlled the issues presented in White. 401 U.S. at 794-95.
" 401 U.S. at 758-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 776-77, 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. Chief Justice Warren, concurring in Lopez, also distinguished between the use of
transmitters, which he found to be within the fourth amendment's purview, and the use of
recorders, which, in his view, is not an unreasonable search and seizure. 373 U.S. at 441-45
(Warren, C.J., concurring). Justice Harlan's rationale has been adopted in at least one state,
see People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 878 (1975), but
it has also been criticized as arbitrary and illogical, see Comment, Eavesdropping, Informers,
and the Right of Privacy: A Judicial Tightrope, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 975, 984 (1967); 17 VILL. L.
REV. 350, 358-59 & nn.50 & 51 (1971).
" 401 U.S. at 795-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 51:41
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dropping is not an unreasonable search and seizure, the validity of
Lopez and On Lee continued to be challenged in the lower federal
courts.47 Nonetheless, if the decisions of the circuit courts and the
Supreme Court's denials of certiorari from those decisions are indic-
ative, the attack on the constitutionality of nonwarrant consensual
interceptions peaked, one vote short of a majority opinion, in White.
Every circuit has adopted the principles enunciated by the plurality
opinion in White.4" Moreover, the distinction which at least some
members of the Supreme Court sought to establish between the use
of a concealed transmitter and a concealed tape recorder has not
been employed in any federal decision rendered subsequent to
White.49 Indeed, while White did not involve the consensual inter-
" See, e.g., United States v. Santillo, 507 F.2d 629, 633 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
968 (1975).
1' See, e.g., District of Columbia Circuit: United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974); United States v. Bishton, 463 F.2d 887 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (per curiam); First Circuit: United States v. Silva, 449 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972); United States v. Friedland, 444 F.2d 710 (1st Cir. 1971);
Second Circuit: United States v. Cioffi, 493 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
Bonanno, 487 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Warren, 453 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 944 (1972); Third Circuit: United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 49 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975); United States v. Santillo, 507 F.2d 629 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 968 (1975); United States v. Osser, 483 F.2d 727 (3d Cir.), cert. denied. 414
U.S. 1028 (1973); Fourth Circuit: United States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 823 (1973); Fifth Circuit: United States v. James, 495 F.2d 434 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 899 (1974); United States v. Rangel, 488 F.2d 871 (5th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 984 (1974); Ansley v. Stynchcombe, 480 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.
1973); United States v. Coley, 441 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 867 (1971);
Sixth Circuit: United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042
(1975); Stephan v. United States, 496 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied. 423
U.S. 861 (1975); United States v. Lippman, 492 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied. 419
U.S. 1107 (1975); Seventh Circuit: United States v. Bastone, 526 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2172 (1976); United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Holmes, 452 F.2d 249 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 909 (1972);
Eighth Circuit: United States v. McMillan, 508 F.2d 101 (8th Cir.), cert. denied. 421 U.S.
916 (1975); United States v. Gocke, 507 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied. 420 U.S. 979
(1975); Meredith v. Gavin, 446 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1971); Ninth Circuit: United States v. Keen,
508 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975); Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973); United States v. Johnson, 484 F.2d 165 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973); Tenth Circuit: United States v. Quintana, 457 F.2d
874 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 877 (1972).
" Relatively few post-White cases involve the use of transmitters. Tape recorders are now
available that are small enough to be concealed upon a person with little likelihood of discov-
ery. Utilization of such recorders greatly enhances the probability that usable tapes will be
obtained. In contrast, transmitters are frequently unreliable, particularly in urban areas
containing multiple dwelling high-rise buildings. Transmitters have an additional disadvan-
tage in that transmission signals have occasionally been picked up by nearby radios and
televisions, enabling an entire neighborhood to monitor the conversation. In New York City,
undercover officers are often equipped with both tape recorders and transmitters, the former
in the hope of capturing the conversation on tape, the latter in the hope that other officers,
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ception of telephone conversations, the circuit courts have read this
decision as authorizing such nonwarrant telephone interceptions,
without distinction as to whether the telephone conversation is over-
heard or recorded by the police. 0
In addition to the constitutional arguments that have been
raised, defendants have also contended that the fruits of a consen-
sual interception should be suppressed in federal prosecutions when
state prohibitions more restrictive than federal statutory and consti-
tutional requirements have been violated. The federal courts have
rejected this contention' in the context of state law violations by
both federal and state officials, reasoning that congressional policy
would be frustrated if state evidentiary rules were applicable in
federal court 2 and that states can adequately enforce their laws by
monitoring the agent's activity, will be able to come to his rescue if he encounters difficulties.
Nonetheless, several federal cases have dealt with the use of transmitters. See, e.g., United
States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974); Ansley
v. Stynchcombe, 480 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bishton, 463 F.2d 887 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (per curiam); United States v. Quintana, 457 F.2d 874 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 877 (1972); United States v. Holmes, 452 F.2d 249 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407
U.S. 909 (1972); United States v. Friedland, 444 F.2d 710 (1st Cir. 1971). See also People v.
Murphy, 8 Cal. 3d 349, 105 Cal. Rptr. 138, 503 P.2d 594 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833
(1973).
" See, e.g., United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 989 (1974); United States v. Silva, 449 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
918 (1972); United States v. Bonanno, 487 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Warren,
453 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 944 (1972); United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d
49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975); United States v. Santillo, 507 F.2d 629 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 968 (1975); United States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 823 (1973); United States v. Rangel, 488 F.2d 871 (5th Cir.)(per curiam),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 984 (1974); Ansley v. Stynchcombe, 480 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Coley, 441 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 867 (1971); United States v.
Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); United States v. Quintana,
508 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. McMillan, 508 F.2d 101 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 916 (1975); United States v. Keen, 508 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 929 (1975); United States v. Quintana, 457 F.2d 874 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
877 (1972). California also does not distinguish between recording and overhearing phone
conversations. See People v. Murphy, 8 Cal. 3d 349, 503 P.2d 594, 105 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1972),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833 (1973).
11 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928), overruled, United States
v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754-55 (1952) (dictum);
United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975).
1 The principle that state law does not govern the rules of evidence in federal courts is
not of recent origin, as is illustrated by Chief Justice Roger Taney's remarks interpreting the
Judiciary Act of 1789:
[Ilt could not be supposed, without very plain words to show it, that Congress
intended to give to the States the power of prescribing the rules of evidence in trials
for offences against the United States. For this construction would in effect place
the criminal jurisprudence of one sovereignty under the control of another.
United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 363 (1851). Accordingly, the federal courts have
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means of civil suits against those who violate their statutes.5 3 For
example, United States v. Neville-4 involved a prosecution, based
almost entirely on an investigation conducted by Illinois law en-
forcement officials, for the transportation of stolen vehicles in inter-
state commerce. With the consent of the defendant's co-conspirator,
police officers, in apparent violation of state law," overheard and
transcribed a telephone conversation between the co-conspirator
and the defendant. At trial, the officer who monitored the phone call
was permitted to testify to the conversation he overheard, and the
Assistant United States Attorney utilized the transcripts of the
overheard conversation to cross-examine the defendant. The Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, stating that "wiretap or
other evidence obtained without violating the Constitution or fed-
eral law is admissible in a federal criminal trial even though ob-
tained in violation of state law."5
refused to apply state evidentiary standards to the admissibility of evidence obtained by
electronic surveillance. See, e.g., United States v. Shaffer, 520 F.2d 1369, 1371-72 (3d Cir.
1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976); United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d
49, 51-52 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975); United States v. Keen, 508 F.2d 986,
989 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975); United States v. Infelice, 506 F.2d 1358,
1365 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975); United States v. Castillo, 449 F.2d
1300, 1301 n.2 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Teller, 412 F.2d 374, 377 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 949 (1971).
"' See United States v. Shaffer, 520 F.2d 1369, 1372 (3d Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (dictum),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976).
516 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1976).
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 14-1 to 14-2 (1973) (amended 1976). At the time of the
Neville decision, one party's consent was sufficient to justify eavesdropping in Illinois. Id. In
1976 the statute was amended to require the consent of all parties unless a warrant is
obtained. Id. § 14-2 (Supp. 1976).
1 516 F.2d at 1309. The Third Circuit reached a similar result in United States v.
Shaffer, 520 F.2d 1369 (1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976), wherein it
enumerated certain policy considerations for deciding evidentiary questions solely on federal,
rather than state law: First, "[i]f the states could require federal courts to exclude evidence
in federal criminal cases, some convictions would undoubtedly be lost, and the enforcement
of congressional policy would be weakened," 530 F.2d at 1372; second, state law enforcement
officials could simply request federal agents "to do the tapping in similar cases in the future,
which would be clearly permissible. . . and would be indistinguishable from the point of view
of the person whose call was intercepted," id.; and third, states prohibiting such activity can
enforce their policies "through the use of civil suits against persons" violating the state law.
Id. See also United States v. Beni, 397 F. Supp. 1086, 1088 (E.D. Wis. 1975) and cases cited
therein. In United States v. Keen, 508 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929
(1975), the court stated that absent a violation of the Federal Constitution, common law
principles, which permit the introduction of evidence irrespective of "its illegal origins," and
not state rules, would apply. 508 F.2d at 989. See also United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313,
327 (10th Cir. 1976). State courts, however, do apply more restrictive state laws to the
activities of both state and federal officials. See People v. Jones, 30 Cal. App. 3d 852, 106
Cal. Rptr. 749 (Ct. App.), appeal dismissed on other grounds, 414 U.S. 804 (1973) (evidence
obtained by eavesdropping proscribed by state law inadmissible in state court regardless of
federal involvement).
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The logic of this approach is compelling from the perspective
of the federal court system. Nonetheless, it appears to establish a
new "silver platter doctrine:" 57 state officials can knowingly violate
their state's laws, so long as the evidence developed during the
investigation makes out a federal as well as a state crime and a
United States Attorney agrees to accept the case.
TITLE III AND THE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
One of the goals Congress sought to accomplish in enacting
Title Ill was "to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral
communications.""8 With minor exceptions,59 law enforcement offi-
cials may not intercept either oral communications or wire commu-
nications without a court order unless they have obtained the con-
sent of a participant to the conversation. 0 Similarly, Congress for-
bade all interceptions of oral or wire communications by private
citizens unless the interception is accomplished by "a party to the
communication or. . .one of the parties has given prior consent to
such interception" and the interception was not conducted "for the
purpose of committing any criminal. . . tortious. . . or. . .other
51 The "silver platter doctrine" was based on Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914). There, the Supreme Court affirmed the admission of illegal evidence procured by local
police officers because the "limitations [of the fourth amendment] reach the Federal Gov-
ernment and its agencies." Id. at 398 (citations omitted). Consequently, the federal courts,
in determining the admissibility of evidence seized in violation of the Constitution and federal
law, based their decisions upon the state or federal character of the seizing entity. See, e.g..
Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 492 (1944); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 32
(1927); Marron v. United States, 18 F.2d 218, 219 (9th Cir. 1926), aff'd on other grounds, 275
U.S. 192 (1927); United States v. Brown, 8 F.2d 630, 631 (D. Ore. 1925), aff'd, 12 F.2d 926
(9th Cir. 1926). The theoretical foundation of this doctrine, however, was undermined by Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), wherein the Court held that the fourth amendment
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures applies to state officers through the four-
teenth amendment. Subsequently, in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213-16 (1960),
the Court abrogated the silver platter doctrine, holding that evidence obtained by a state
officer's illegal search and seizure is inadmissible in evidence in a federal trial.
In recent years, several states have interpreted their own laws and constitutions more
restrictively than federal courts have in applying the analogous federal law. This has been
particularly true in such areas as electronic surveillance, search and seizure, and the use of
confessions obtained in violation of a defendant's fifth amendment rights. Such evidence,
excluded from state trials, may nonetheless be admitted in federal trials. See 18 CRim. L. REP.
(BNA) 2507 (1976). As a result, a new "silver platter" concept may be developing, although
based on a different legal theory than the pre-Elkins doctrine. See United States v. Ramsey,
367 F. Supp. 1307 (W.D. Mo. 1973). See generally Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120-21
(1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801, 82
Stat. 197 (1968).
2, See note 12 supra.
" See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1970).
TITLE III
injurious act."'" Communications intercepted in violation of these
or other provisions of Title III may not be admitted into evidence.,
2
In most instances, then, it is a relatively easy task to determine
under Title III whether an oral or a wire communication may be
lawfully intercepted without a court order, and whether the con-
tents63 of the communication may be disclosed: absent a court order,
if no participant to the communication consents to its interception,
the privacy of the communication is protected from interception or
disclosure. 4 Determining where the "privacy of communications"
ends and the right to intercept and disclose begins, however, is not
always so simple. Is invocation of the statutory protection depen-
dent upon the participants having an expectation of privacy when
they communicate, and if so, by what standards is that expectation
to be measured? Is the consent of a nonparticipant to the communi-
cation sufficient to defeat that expectation, and if so, under what
circumstances? Is it proper to frustrate one conversant's expecta-
tions of privacy by misleading him as to the identity of the other
conversant? If a private citizen intercepts a communication under
circumstances requiring suppression if conducted by law enforce-
ment officials, may law enforcement officials nonetheless use or
disclose the fruits of the interception?65
Title III, state statutes modeled in whole or in part upon Title
III, and the courts of several jurisdictions have dealt with these
issues, occasionally in contradictory fashion. This section will dis-
cuss the expectation of privacy as it affects the interception of oral
a' Id. § 2511(2)(d).
"1 Id. § 2515 provides:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the
contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be re-
ceived in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court,
grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or
other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof if
the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.
See also id. § 2511(1), which makes the willful interception of a communication or the dis-
closure or use of an intercepted communication in violation of that subsection punishable by
imprisonment for up to five years and/or a fine of up to $10,000.
11 The "contents" of a communication are defined as including "any information con-
cerning the identity of the parties to such communication or the existence, substance, pur-
port, or meaning of that communication." Id. § 2510(8).
, For a description of the exceptions to the general protection provided by Title III, see
note 12 supra.
" The constitutional underpinnings of the exclusionary rule do not mandate exclusion
of evidence obtained illegally by a private citizen and surrendered to governmental authori-
ties since the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures only
restricts governmental action. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); note 113 infra.
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and wire communications, interceptions by impersonation, and use
by law enforcement officials of interceptions by private citizens.
Oral Communications and the Expectation of Privacy
Title III defines "oral communication" as "any. . .communi-
cation uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such com-
munication is not subject to interception under circumstances justi-
fying such expectation."66 Discussing this definition, the Senate
Judiciary Committee commented:
The person's subjective intent or the place where the communica-
tion is uttered is not necessarily the controlling factor. Neverthe-
less, such an expectation would clearly be unjustified in certain
areas; for example, a jail cell or an open field. . . .The person's
expectation that his communication is or is not subject to "inter-
ception," . . . is thus to be gathered and evaluated from and in
terms of all the facts and circumstances. 7
If "all the facts and circumstances" render the conversants' expec-
tations of privacy unjustified, the communication is not an oral
communication within the definition, and the interception, use, and
disclosure of that communication does not violate the statute.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the defini-
tion of oral communication in affirming a conviction for possession
of heroin in United States v. Pui Kan Lam. " There, the wife of the
superintendent of an apartment building informed the authorities
that four oriental males had attempted to gain admission to an
apartment previously occupied by other orientals who had been
arrested on heroin importation charges. Federal agents investigated
the complaint and received permission from the current tenants to
search the apartment and to "'do anything they want[ed] to.' ",89
After discovering several pounds of heroin hidden behind a base-
board, the agents concealed a microphone under a mattress in the
room where the heroin was secreted. They did not obtain a warrant
authorizing the use of electronic eavesdropping. An hour and a half
later, as was expected, three of the four defendants returned to the
" 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1970). The statute's definition of "wire communication" contains
no reference to expectation of privacy. See notes 92-93 and accompanying text infra. The
court in United States v. Carroll, 332 F. Supp. 1299 (D.D.C. 1971), noting this distinction
held that overhearing and recording of one end of a telephone conversation from an adjacent
room is not the interception of a "wire communication." Id. at 1301.
'7 S. REP., supra note 2, at 90, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. at 2178 (citations omitted).
" 483 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974).
483 F.2d at 1203.
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TITLE III
apartment, claiming they had come to retrieve immigration papers
that had been left there. A federal agent, posing as the superintend-
ent's helper, admitted them and then left them in the apartment,
where their activities were monitored and their conversations, in
Chinese, recorded by the use of the concealed microphone. The
defendants were arrested as they left the apartment with a shopping
bag containing the heroin.
70
At trial, the Government introduced, as rebuttal evidence, the
tape and a translated transcript of the recorded conversation. The
defendants were convicted and, on appeal, they argued that the
interception was unlawful under Title III and the fourth amend-
ment. Acknowledging the lack of a warrant or participant consent,
the Second Circuit nonetheless found that the defendants did not
have a justifiable expectation of privacy.7' As a result, the fourth
amendment was inapplicable and there had been no oral communi-
cation as defined in Title III. The court reasoned:
As we have been advised, "the Fourth Amendment protects peo-
ple, not places," . . . and the statutory definition of an "oral com-
munication" tracks this constitutional concept. The question we
have before us is whether the subjective expectation of privacy
violated by the allegedly illegal intrusion is one society is prepared
to recognize as 'justifiable. . . ." Measured by this objective
standard appellants' expectations must fail. The interception here
did not occur in a public phone booth, . . . a suspect's home, ...
or office, . . . or the home of a friend into which appellants had
been invited. . . .Rather it occurred in the house of complete
strangers to which appellants had made several suspicious visits
and into which they tried to gain entry by false representations,
which alone would seem sufficient to deny them any expectation
of privacy. Further, appellants were granted entry into the house
by a "superintendent's helper" who then departed and left them
alone. Under the circumstances appellants may be held to have
assumed that their activities might be monitored.71
7' Id. at 1204.
71 As to two defendants who had not been present in the apartment when the conversa-
tions were monitored, the court held that they did not have standing to challenge the legality
of the interception on either constitutional or Title m grounds, since these defendants had
not established "that their personal rights were violated by the allegedly illegal interception."
Id. at 1205.
7Id. at 1206 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). The last two
sentences of the quoted passage seem inherently contradictory. When the defendants were
left alone, their subjective expectations of privacy presumably were enhanced rather than
diminished.
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In effect, the Second Circuit has held that under these somewhat
unusual facts, the protection of society from the distribution of her-
oin is more important than protection of these defendants' subjec-
tive expectations of privacy.7 3
Notably, the tenants of the apartment had given the federal
agents permission to "do anything they want[ed] to."74 This im-
plied consent by the tenants to the use of the bug was one of the
facts considered by the Second Circuit in evaluating the reasonable-
ness of the defendants' expectations. 5 Four years prior to Pui Kan
Lam, the Supreme Court, in a footnote in Alderman v. United
States," indicated that consent by the owner of the premises might
have great significance at least when the owner was a criminal asso-
ciate of the third-party conversants. The issues in Alderman in-
cluded whether a defendant had standing to suppress conversations
in which he did not participate, but which were intercepted on his
premises.77 While discussing this question, the Court noted:
73 Interestingly, after finding that the defendants had no justifiable expectation of pri-
vacy under the circumstances and thus the conversation was not protected, the court stated:
Additionally, in delineating the scope of the statutory and constitutional protec-
tions, the value of the law enforcement activity, as well as the officers' reasons for
not obtaining a warrant, should also be considered. The value of the interception
here is obvious, since it enabled relevant evidence against appellants to be gathered
that could be obtained by no other means. The reason for not securing a warrant
was simply, and justifiably, the pressure of time.
Id. at 1206-07 (citations omitted). This discussion of the "value of the law enforcement
activity" at least suggests that under different circumstances the court might impose limits
on nonwarrant eavesdropping even in the absence of an expectation of privacy. Cf. White v.
Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975) (en banc) (undercover police
surveillance of university classroom prima facie violation of State and Federal Constitutions);
text accompanying note 258 infra.
" 483 F.2d at 1203.
The tenants' consent alone could not authorize the interception since the consenting
individual must be a "party to the communication." See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1970); cf.
S. REP., supra note 2, at 94, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. at 2182 (defining party as the actual
participant). On the other hand, even if the agents had bugged the apartment without the
tenants' permission, the defendants would have lacked standing to assert a violation of the
tenants' right to enjoy the premises free from unreasonable search and seizure.
394 U.S. 165, 179 n.11 (1969).
" A five-Justice majority held that such a defendant would have standing even though
his "conversational privacy" would not have been violated, Noting that the fourth amend-
ment secures the individual's right to enjoy his premises free from unreasonable searches and
seizures and that unlawfully overheard conversations, like physical evidence seized during an
illegal search, are "fruits of an illegal entry," id. at 177-78, the Court stated:
The rights of the owner of the premises are as clearly invaded when the police enter
and install a listening device in his house as they are when the entry is made to
undertake a warrantless search for tangible property; and the prosecution as surely
employs the fruits of an illegal search of the home when it offers overheard third-
party conversations as it does when it introduces tangible evidence belonging not
to the homeowner, but to others.
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Those who converse and are overheard when the owner is not pres-
ent . . . have a valid objection unless the owner of the premises
has consented to the surveillance. . . . The Fourth Amendment
protects reasonable expectations of privacy and does not protect
persons engaged in crime from the risk that those with whom they
associate or converse will cooperate with the government.75
Taken at face value, this language suggests that law enforcement
officials, having obtained the cooperation of a member of a criminal
organization, can lawfully bug their informer's premises and inter-
cept the conversations of his criminal associates regardless of the
informer's presence and without either a court order or the consent
of a participant to the conversations.7 9
Thus, the Alderman footnote indicates that a person's expecta-
tions of privacy are not justified when he is on a criminal associate's
premises if that criminal associate has consented to the eavesdrop-
ping, and Pui Kan Lam holds such expectations unjustified when
the conversants are intruding on another's premises under false pre-
tenses and with criminal design." In each instance, the authorities
Id. at 179-80. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) (1970), which defines an aggrieved person as "a person
who was a party to any intercepted wire or oral communication or a person against whom
the interception was directed."
11 394 U.S. at 179 n.11 (emphasis added) (citations omitted), citing Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966). For a discussion of Hoffa, see note 17 supra.
11 If a criminal cannot have a reasonable expectation that his associates will not cooper-
ate with the police, conversations conducted on premises belonging to a criminal associate
will not be "oral communications" at all if the owner consents to surveillance. Consequently,
the evidence of these conversations will not be subject to the exclusionary rule of Title III.
As to the effect of the owner's consent when the conversants are not criminal associates, see
note 83 infra.
"* It is worthwhile to note that many, but not all, states that have enacted wiretapping
and eavesdropping statutes follow the Title I formula of protecting only those oral communi-
cations uttered under justifiable expections of privacy. State laws which parallel the Title
ImI formula defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1970) include CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(c) (West
1970); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-15-101(8) (1973); DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 1336(a)(9) (1974); FLA.
STAT. § 934.02 (Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. §§ 21-4001(2), 22-2514(2) (1974); ME. REV. STAT. tit.
15, § 709(5) (Supp. 1975); MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 750.539(a)(1) (1970); NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-
701(2) (1971); NEV. REv. STAT. § 179.440 (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:1 (1974); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-2(b) (West 1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-04(2) (1976); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §12-5.1-1(b) (Supp. 1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 23-13A-1(2) (Supp. 1976); VA.
CODE § 19.2-61(2) (1975); Wis. STAT. § 968.27(2) (1973). But see People v. Beavers, 393 Mich.
554, 227 N.W.2d 511, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 878 (1975); State ex rel. Arnold v. County Court,
51 Wis. 2d 434, 187 N.W.2d 354 (1971). State statutes which apparently protect oral commu-
nications whether or not conducted under circumstances justifying an expectation of privacy
include ALASKA STAT. § 11.60.290(1) (1970); GA. CODE § 26-3001 (Supp. 1976); MD. CTS. &
JuD. PRoC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(a) (1974); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(B)(2) (West
1970); N.Y. CaiM. Paoc. LAW § 700.05(3)(b) (McKinney 1971).
Interesting questions of law are likely to arise when the overheard conversations wer
conducted via citizen band radios in those states which protect communications without
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would appear to have, if not probable cause, at least a reasonable
suspicion that unlawful activity was afoot. Would the denial of such
expectations extend to other situations and other types of premises?
Consent by the owner to the interception of conversations on his
premises should not be sufficient to overcome the conversants' ex-
pectations of privacy if the conversation is privileged8" Nor should
such consent authorize indiscriminate interceptions of conversa-
tions in quasi-public, commercial, industrial, or governmental
premises, 2 since allowing eavesdropping on such a widespread scale
would have a disastrously chilling effect on the exercise of first
amendment freedoms." Moreover, the incorporation of such a broad
exception into the federal definition of oral communication would
seriously jeopardize the privacy of conversation and consequently
thwart one of the express purposes underlying the enactment of
Title III. The question remains, however, exactly where the line
separating justified from unjustified expectations of privacy is to be
drawn." The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit encountered this
reference to justifiable expectations of privacy. If a police officer gathers evidence of crime
while monitoring a citizen band radio, is he "intercepting" an "oral communication?" If so,
must this evidence be excluded despite the conversants' obvious lack of any justifiable expec-
tation of privacy; or does the public nature of this communication afford all listeners the de
jure status of "participants" to the conversation?
8, See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (1970).
;2 The use of surveillance in public or quasi-public places is deemed impliedly consented
to, if the surveillance is used for security reasons. See S. REP., supra note 2. at 94, reprinted
in U.S. CODE CONG. at 2182.
The footnote in Alderman apparently limits the ability of an owner to authorize inter-
ceptions on his premises to situations where the parties to the intercepted conversation are
criminal associates of the owner. An absent owner could not authorize law enforcement
officials to monitor conversations of persons lawfully on his premises who were not engaged
in criminal activity, any more than an owner could himself conduct such nonconsensual
surveillance. In such a situation, the rationale of the Alderman footnote would not apply, the
"value of the law enforcement activity," see note 73 supra, would be nil, and the conversants'
expectations of privacy would be justified, see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1968).
Violation of those expectations would subject the owner and the law enforcement officials to
criminal prosecution, see 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1970), and to civil liability, see 18 U.S.C. §
2520 (1970).
11 This question has often arisen in situations involving interception of the conversation
of an individual in custody. Whether a particular jurisdiction allows its officials to monitor
prisoners' conversations would appear to depend in part upon how that jurisdiction defines
those "oral communications" that are protected from nonwarrant, nonconsenual intercep-
tion. Jurisdictions which protect only conversations conducted in circumstances justifying an
expectation of privacy are more likely to permit interception of prisoners' conversations. See,
e.g., S. REP., supra note 2, at 90, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. at 2178. Those states which
protect all oral communications probably do not permit such interceptions. See note 80 supra.
Telephone conversations between prisoners and people outside the facility are likely to be
immune from interception and disclosure since definitions of "wire communications" do not
utilize the expectation of privacy concept. See notes 92-102 and accompanying text infra;
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issue in United States v. Padilla,"5 and reached a conclusion which
appears to conflict with the Supreme Court's suggestions in
Alderman and perhaps the Second Circuit's holding in Pui Kan
Lam.
In Padilla, government undercover agents, negotiating a pur-
chase of narcotics from the defendant, agreed to meet with him in
a hotel in Puerto Rico. The government rented a room for Padilla
and a room for its agents. Both rooms were rented under the name
of one of the agents. A hidden microphone was installed in defen-
dant's hotel room and used to monitor and record Padilla's conver-
sations with the undercover agents.
The First Circuit, in upholding the suppression of these tapes,
reasoned:
The government would have us overlook the fact that a micro-
phone was installed in the hotel room without prior authority and
consider the case as if the agent carried a recording device on him,
thus bringing it within the authority of United States v. White
.... It assures us that only conversations between the agent and
defendant were recorded.
The government's position would turn on its head the care-
fully tailored exception to the Katz protection afforded one's ex-
pectation of privacy. . . . Electronic devices could be installed for
lengthy periods of time without antecedent authority, so long as
only a suspect's conversations with police agents were offered in
evidence and the enforcement officials alleged that nothing else
was recorded. Under this approach a room or an entire
hotel-could be bugged permanently with impunity and with the
hope that some usable conversations with agents would occur."
People v. Tebo, 37 Mich. App. 141, 194 N.W.2d 517 (1971) (police use of extension phone to
overhear arrestee's conversation in police station an "interception" within Title III).
California law provides that when a person is in custody his circumstances are such that
he should "reasonably expect that [his] communication[s] may be overheard or recorded,"
CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(c) (West 1970), and evidence of these conversations is regularly
admitted at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 888 (N.D. Cal. 1976); People
v. Newton, 42 Cal. App. 3d 292, 116 Cal. Rptr. 690 (Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
937 (1975); People v. Todd, 26 Cal. App. 3d 15, 102 Cal. Rptr. 539 (Ct. App. 1972). However,
interception of communications between a prisoner and his attorney, clergyman, or physician
is generally prohibited. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 636 (West 1970). See also North v. Superior
Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 502 P.2d 1305, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1972) (en banc), discussed in Com-
ment, 76 W. VA. L. Rav. 228 (1974), wherein the court held that tapes made of a conversation
between a prisoner and his spouse should not have been admitted into evidence since the
couple had been lulled into believing that their conversation was confidential, and they had,
therefore, a reasonable expectation of privacy.
520 F.2d 526 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1975).
' 520 F.2d at 527-28 (citations omitted).
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Furthermore, the Padilla court read White as limited to its facts,
stating that although a person's expectation of privacy can lawfully
be "frustrated" when a defendant mistakenly confides in one who
is a government agent, the "built-in limitation. . . is that no more
can be recorded than is given to one who is, mistakenly or not,
trusted. When one's confidante leaves his premises, he is left with
an expectation of privacy in his surroundings which is not only
actual but justifiable .... ,,87
It is difficult to discern the precise rationale upon which the
court based its suppression ruling. If "only conversations between
the agent and the defendant were recorded," 8 the decision was ap-
parently premised upon what the court saw as a violation of the
defendant's proprietary, rather than conversational, privacy. But
the decision does not make clear whether the court concluded that
the hotel room was a constitutionally protected area within which
the defendant had a justifiable expectation of privacy such that the
installation of the bug, although not the manner in which it was
used, constituted a violation of that privacy.
As a result of the court's incomplete discussion of its holding,
the intended effect of the- decision is difficult to discern. A general
prohibition on the bugging of premises without a court order would
present a conflict with Pui Kan Lam as well as with the dicta of the
Supreme Court in Alderman. On the other hand, if Padilla is read
as suppressing the recordings because the room, though technically
not the defendant's premises, was in fact his residence and therefore
constitutionally protected from government intrusions without ei-
ther a court order or his consent, the First Circuit's holding may be
harmonized with the other precedents in this area.
In Commonwealth v. Donnelly,8" for example, an informant
told government officials that the defendant had offered to sell him
stolen United States bonds. The informant then met the defendant
in the informant's hotel room, which the government had rented
and bugged with the informant's consent, and discussed the sale of
the bonds. The next day, the defendant returned, sold some of the
bonds, and was arrested. On appeal from the defendant's convic-
1, Id. at 527. The court apparently concluded that the hotel room was "his (Padilla's)
premises" even though it had been rented by and in the name of government agents who had
consented to the placement and use of monitoring equipment therein. Moreover, the court
found the defendant's expectations of privacy therein justified even though he intended to
use the room to commit a crime.
Id. at 527.
233 Pa. Super. 396, 336 A.2d 632 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 974 (1976).
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tion, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the installation
of the eavesdropping device in the informant's room did not violate
either Title III or the fourth amendment since the informant had
consented to the recording." Unlike Padilla, the defendant in
Donnelly was not residing in the room, and therefore did not have
a justifiable expectation of privacy with regard to the hotel room.9
Despite the possibility of reconciliation between Padilla and
other decisions dealing with justifiable expectations of privacy, the
parameters of this concept with regard to the interception of oral
communications are still quite vague. Whether Padilla conflicts
with Pui Kan Lam; whether the inferences which may be drawn
from the Alderman footnote become law; whether, in sum, justi-
fiable expectations are to be found in many or only a few circum-
stances where criminal activity is afoot-all are issues at the most
rudimentary stage of development.
Wire Communications
The Title Il definition of "wire communication" differs signifi-
cantly from the definition of "oral communication." A wire commu-
nication is
any communication made in whole or in part through the use of
facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of
wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and
the point of reception furnished or operated by any person engaged
as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the
transmission of interstate or foreign communications.
A telephone call or telegram is a wire communication within this
definition and is thus protected by Title HI regardless of whether the
233 Pa. Super. at 413, 336 A.2d at 639.
11 Cf. Ladner v. State, 276 So. 2d 686 (Miss. 1973), wherein an undercover agent reserved
a hotel room at the request of defendant for the purpose of making a drug sale. A hole was
cut in the curtains in the room so that police officers might observe the transaction. Id. at
687. Although the room was not bugged as in Donnelly and Padilla, the undercover agent wore
a transmitter which enabled officers behind the curtains to hear the conversation. The defen-
dant came to the hotel room, the sale was made, and the officers entered the room and
arrested the defendant. Id. The Supreme Court of Mississippi rejected defendant's claim that
the testimony of the eavesdropping officers was illegally obtained and thus inadmissable.
This claim was based on defendant's contention that because she had asked the agent to
reserve the room, it was "her room" and thus the entry of the officers without a warrant was
illegal. Id. Noting that one involved in illegal activities must assume the risk that an associate
may report to the police, the court declared that "it is only speculation to assert that the
defendant's utterances would be substantially different or his sense of security any less if he
also thought it possible that the suspected colleague is wired for sound." Id. at 688.
92 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1970).
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participants actually have any justifiable expectations of privacy.93
Were it otherwise, all conversations conducted on partyline tele-
phones might be vulnerable to warrantless wiretapping.
A case illustrating this possibility, Lee v. Florida, " reached the
Supreme Court in 1968. There, state police, using special equip-
ment, hooked into the defendant's partyline telephone and recorded
incriminating conversations, which were played at trial. Basing its
decision upon the prohibition against interception and divulgence
of telephone conversations contained in section 605 of the Commu-
nications Act of 1934, 95 rather than upon the underlying fourth and
fourteenth amendment issues,96 the Court rejected the Govern-
ment's argument that there had been no interception since a party-
line user "should realize that [he] . . . might be overheard,"97 and
reversed the conviction.98 Although the Court observed that this
was not a case "where the police merely picked up the receiver on
an ordinary party line," it nonetheless implied that it would have
suppressed the tapes even were it such a case on the grounds that
"[t]here is nothing in the language or history of § 605 to indicate
that Congress meant to afford any less protection to those who, by
virtue of geography or financial hardship, must use party-line tele-
phones."99 Had the events in Lee occurred after the enactment of
"See United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346, 349 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hall,
488 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Banks, 374 F. Supp. 321, 327 (W.D.S.D.
1974), appeal dismissed, 513 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1975).
' 392 U.S. 378 (1968).
" Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934) (current version at
47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970)). The Lee decision was rendered shortly before Congress enacted Title
III.
See 392 U.S. at 379 n.2.
'7 Id. at 380-81.
" Section 605, dealing only with wire communications, banned all interceptions of these
communications and any divulgence of information gained through an interception. Thus,
the threshold definitional question involved the term "interception." In Rathbun v. United
States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957), the Supreme Court held that interception does not include
listening to a telephone conversation on an extension phone with the consent of one of the
parties to the conversation, since "there has been no violation of any privacy of which the
parties may complain." Id. at 111. This apparent incorporation of a justifiable expectation
of privacy test into the definition of interception was restricted in Lee to those situations in
which a conversant consents to the surveillance. The Court's treatment of wire communica-
tion under § 605 was apparently perpetuated by Congress in Title III. Unlike an oral commu-
nication, a Title I wire communication is not defined with reference to justifiable expecta-
tions. Rather, a wire communication interception requires participant consent to justify a
nonwarrant interception, just as under § 605 before 1968 consent was necessary to justify any
interception of a wire communication. With enactment of Title I, § 605 was amended to
allow interceptions that comply with Title I requirements. The present version of § 605 is
aimed at regulating the conduct of the employees of communications common carriers and
not the conduct of the public. S. REP., supra note 2, at 107-08, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG.
at 2197.
" 392 U.S. at 381 n.5.
TITLE III
Title III, the defendant's conversation would have been a wire
communication, shielded by Title III from the nonwarrant and non-
consensual surveillance conducted in Lee. '
The absence of an expectation of privacy condition in the defi-
nition of wire communication makes it clear that whatever signifi-
cance might be attached to the consent of the owner of the premises
on which oral communications are intercepted,'"' the owner's con-
sent to the interception of conversations on his telephone is irrele-
vant to the existence of a wire communication if he is not a party
to the call.'"2 Justifiable privacy expectations must, nonetheless, be
considered in the wire communication area when a nonwarrant in-
terception is consented to by a participant but is objected to as
violative of another person's fourth amendment rights. Such a case
is presented when police officers, executing a search warrant for
gambling records and paraphernalia, attach a recording device to
telephones on the premises and answer and record incoming calls
by impersonating the intended recipient. 3 In this situation, the
' See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1970).
'u, See text accompanying notes 75-79 supra.
" It should be noted, however, that under Title III an interception does not occur unless
a device is used, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1970), and the definition of device excludes a telephone
used in the regular course of the subscriber's business. Id. § 2510(5). Thus, an owner's consent
to use of an extension telephone may have significance with respect to the occurrence of an
interception of a wire communication. See note 124 and accompanying text infra. It should
not, however, have any effect on the initial determination that a wire communication has
occurred. Cf. United States v. San Martin, 469 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
934 (1973). In San Martin, a suspect arrested for narcotics importation agreed to let federal
agents tap the telephone in his hotel room. A second suspect, Gonzalez, entered the room,
used the phone, and had a conversation with the defendant, San Martin. After the phone
call, Gonzalez was arrested, "and, without being told by anyone about the bug, agreed to
cooperate." 469 F.2d at 6 (emphasis in original). As a result of Gonzalez' cooperation, San
Martin was arrested later that day for possession of heroin and was subsequently convicted.
On appeal, the Second Circuit expressed strong misgivings about the lawfulness of the tap,
but affirmed the conviction. The court stressed that "[t]he contents of the conversation were
not incriminating or offered in evidence," that "Gonzalez' cooperation was not effected by
the use of the tap," and that therefore "the Government had an independent source, Gonzalez
himself," which led to "evidence of [defendant's] involvement. . . . Thus, even if there were
a poisoned tree (the wiretap) . . . [the Government] had an alternate healthy tree from
which to eat." Id. at 8. Had the tap in San Martin contributed in any material way to the
defendant's arrest or conviction, it is clear that reversal would have been mandated. This
result would be necessary because "[t]he exlcusionary prohibition extends as well to the
indirect as the direct products of such invasions" and "protects against the overhearing of
verbal statements as well as against the more traditional seizure of 'papers and effects.'"
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 485 (1963) (citation omitted). See also United
States v. Cole, 463 F.2d 163 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
"1 Congress clearly intended that the consent of the impersonator would be sufficient to
qualify the interception for exemption under the consensual provisions of Title III. The
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officers may be regarded as parties to the conversations, whose con-
sent would normally overcome constitutional and federal statutory
objections' °4 to the use of the evidence.' 5 This technique, however,
differs significantly from the consensual interception involved in
White. There, the defendant lacked a justifiable expectation of pri-
vacy because he was conversing with a known associate and as-
sumed the risk that his associate might be cooperating with the
police. In impersonation interceptions, the privacy expectations
held by both the caller and the intended recipient of the call are
frustrated.
In Flaherty v. Arkansas,'0" a case involving interceptions by
impersonation, Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, dissented from the denial of certiorari to the Supreme
Court of Arkansas and asserted that:
Senate Report described the party capable of giving consent as "the person actually partici-
pating in the communication." S. REP., supra note 2, at 94, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. at
2182, citing United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 839 (1964).
Pasha involved the introduction at trial of recorded phone calls to the defendants' gambling
business. The calls had been answered by a government agent who gave the name of one of
the defendants upon being asked his identity. The court rejected the defendants' contention
that use of the evidence produced by the impersonation violated their fourth and fifth amend-
ment rights. In so holding, the court cited Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928),
which "held that telephone conversations intercepted by police officers were not protected
by the fourth and fifth amendments." 332 F.2d at 197. Accord, State v. Carbone, 38 N.J. 19,
183 A.2d 1 (1962). As to the defendants' claims that the impersonation violated § 605 of the
Communications Act of 1934 and hence the product thereof was inadmissible, the court held
that "impersonation of the intended receiver is not an interception within the meaning of the
statute." 332 F.2d at 198. The approval with which Pasha was cited indicates that Congress
intended to approve interception by impersonation. See State v. Vizzini, 115 N.J. Super. 97,
278 A.2d 235 (App. Div. 1971) (impersonation interception does not violate Title III, constitu-
tionality of use of impersonation not discussed). The overruling of Olmstead in United States
v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), however, revitalizes the constitutional claims of individuals
in circumstances similar to those in Pasha. See text accompanying notes 106-08 infra.
0, See note 103 supra.
1"' The federal courts, in the limited instances wherein they have faced the question, have
held that interception by impersonation does not violate either the Constitution or federal
statute. See United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 839 (1964).
See also United States v. Lewis, 87 F. Supp. 970 (D.D.C.), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom.
Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950). It should be noted, however, that these
cases were decided prior to enactment of Title III and hence focused upon the word "inter-
cept" as used in § 605 of the Communications Act of 1934. Although a New Jersey state court
has held that interception by impersonation meets the statutory specifications of Title I,
see State v. Vizzini, 115 N.J. Super. 97, 278 A.2d 235 (App. Div. 1971), the federal courts
have not determined the constitutional and statutory merits of impersonation interception
after the decisions in Katz and White and the enactment of Title IIn. Since such interceptions
have been specifically authorized in at least one state, see DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 1336(b) (1974)
(prosecutions for gambling offenses only), and apparently authorized by Congress, see note
103 supra, the critical question is the constitutionality of this technique.
1- 255 Ark. 187, 500 S.W.2d 87 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 995 (1974).
TITLE III
Lopez and White do not reach the instant case. The principle
underlying them is that when one reveals information to an indi-
vidual, one takes the risk that one's confidence in that individual
is misplaced . . . But here the callers were deceived as to the
identities of the individual with whom they were speaking.0
Justice Douglas foresaw ominous implications in the impersonation
concept:
Allowing the government to practice deception in this case carries
the seeds of destroying a substantial part of the congressional plan
in Title III and its constitutional underpinnings. . . . [The prin-
ciple would seemingly extend beyond this situation, even to the
situation where the police intercepted calls before they reached a
recipient's telephone and mimicked the intended recipient's voice,
inducing a conversation to which the police were "parties."...
We have not yet reached the point where the people must use
secret passwords to establish their identitites when communicat-
ing by telephone. '
One would hope and expect that our courts would never permit
the type of impersonation interceptions feared by Justice Douglas.
To avoid this result, it seems appropriate to require, under the
fourth amendment, that such interceptions be made pursuant to a
search warrant which contains an authorization to record the in-
coming phone calls, a direction that innocent calls be terminated as
quickly as possible, and a limitation of the interception period to the
time necessary to complete the physical search of the premises." 9
Since the receiving officers do consent to the interception, however,
a wiretap warrant under Title III would be unnecessary.10 Intercep-
tions by impersonation would thus be subjected to prior judicial
scrutiny and remain limited to search warrant situations, thereby
foreclosing the possibility of expansion feared by Justices Douglas,
Brennan, and Marshall. At the same time, this law enforcement
'0 415 U.S. at 999 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 999-1000.
' Such provisions seem necessary to comply with the fourth amendment requirement
that a search warrant "particularly describe the ... thing to be seized," and to prevent the
warrant from purporting to authorize the use of impersonation to conduct an impermissibly
broad "general search" of all incoming calls. See also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60
(1967) (eavesdropping warrants must limit the time for and the conversations subject to
interception).
I'D See note 103 supra. See also Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 689-99 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(en banc) (Wilkey, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1685 (1976).
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technique would retain its needed flexibility by avoiding the time-
consuming requirements of Title II."
Use of Private Citizen Interceptions
In enacting Title III Congress sought to protect the privacy of
oral and wire communications from intrusion by private citizens as
well as by law enforcement officials. Thus, interceptions by private
citizens are proscribed unless a party to the conversation consents
to the eavesdropping.12 Many states have gone even further, ban-
ning interceptions by private citizens altogether unless all parties to
the communication consent to the interception.
When an individual intrudes upon the privacy of another, ei-
ther inadvertently or deliberately, may law enforcement officials
utilize the fruits of the interception against the victim of the intru-
sion? It is generally held that the fourth amendment excludes the
fruits of unreasonable searches and seizures conducted by the state,
but does not preclude the state from using the fruits of searches and
seizures conducted by private citizens."' Does this principle apply
when the private "search and seizure" involves the interception of
communications? If law enforcement officials may use the fruits of
such interceptions, to what extent may they do so? Does it matter
whether the interception was an inadvertent or a deliberate intru-
sion into the privacy of others in violation of law?
Title I expressly prohibits the admission of evidence gained
through unlawful interceptions."' Although there is little, if any,
federal law interpreting the effect of this prohibition on eavesdrop-
ping by private individuals, the courts of several states have dis-
" Congress intended to exclude impersonation eavesdropping from the Title III warrant
requirements. See note 103 supra.
112 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1970); see S. REP., supra note 2, at 69, reprinted in U.S. CODE
CONG. at 2156, where it states that "the use of wiretapping or electronic surveillance tech-
niques by private unauthorized hands has little justification where communications are inter-
cepted without the consent of one of the participants." Moreover, while Title Im states that
it "shall not be unlawful" for a private citizen to intercept a wire communication when he is
a party or a party has consented, it explicitly forbids consensual interceptions for criminal
or tortious purposes. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1970).
H3 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971) (dictum); Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475-76 (1921); United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391, 398 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1127 (1975); United States v. Valen, 479 F.2d 467, 469 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 901 (1974); United States v. Blanton, 479 F.2d 327, 328 (5th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Wilkerson, 478 F.2d 813, 815 (8th Cir. 1973) (per curiam);
United States v. McGuire, 381 F.2d 306, 313 n.5 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1053
(1968); Barnes v. United States, 373 F.2d 517, 518 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Goldberg,
330 F.2d 30, 35 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970).
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cussed the permissibility under state law of police use of informa-
tion obtained by private citizen interceptions. These decisions are
discussed in this section, with regard to both inadvertent and delib-
erate, unlawful interceptions by private citizens.
1. The Accidental Good Citizen Interception
When a private citizen inadvertently intercepts an incriminat-
ing conversation to which he is not a party and reports what he has
heard to the authorities, it has generally been held that law enforce-
ment officials may use this information. Such a result has been
reached when incriminating conversations, inadvertently overheard
on a partyline telephone, were reported to the police, resulting in the
defendant's conviction for homicide,1 1 5 and when a suspicious tele-
phone conversation, accidentally overheard by a hotel desk clerk,
led to the seizure of LSD anid marijuana." 6 In each case, the courts
approved the use of the intercepted information by the police and
the admission of the accidental eavesdropper's testimony at trial
despite the fact that the citizens listened for a fairly extended period
of time."'
The courts of two states have also had occasion to consider
whether, subsequent to a private citizen's inadvertent interception
due to a crossing of telephone lines, the police may use the malfunc-
tioning phone to monitor criminal conversations and gather evi-
dence leading to the arrest of the person whose phone had crossed
I's Roberts v. State, 453 P.2d 898 (Alas. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1022 (1970). The
interception in Roberts was truly inadvertent, as the subscriber had requested and received
a private telephone line which the phone company then converted to party line service
without advising the subscriber.
"I State ex rel. Flournoy v. Wren, 108 Ariz. 356, 498 P.2d 444 (1972) (en banc) (accidental
interception not a violation of Title III). In Williams v. State, 507 P.2d 1339 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1973), a hotel manager, answering a call to the switchboard from one of the rooms,
overheard and recorded the commission of a murder. Reasoning that the hotel manager had
not interfered with any telephone lines, but had instead recorded a conversation to which he
was a party, the court stated that a Title III interception had not occurred and the statute's
exclusionary rule did not apply. Id. at 1341-42. Consequently, the court, though it did not
explicitly attach significance to the private-citizen status of the hotel manager, affirmed the
conviction and held that the recording had been properly received in evidence. Although the
result in this case is clearly justified, the interpretation of the term interception does not
comport with congressional intent. See S. REP., supra note 2, at 90, reprinted in U.S. CODE
CONG. at 2178. A preferable rationale would acknowledge that use of the tape recorder was
an interception but, due to the hotel manager's consent, not one in violation of Title H. See
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1970).
," See Roberts v. State, 453 P.2d 898, 901-02 (Alas. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1022
(1970); State ex rel. Flournoy v. Wren, 108 Ariz. 356, 360-61, 498 P.2d 444, 448-49 (1972) (en
banc).
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with the private citizen's. In State v. McCartin,'"' a local resident
asked police to investigate strange noises and voices on his daugh-
ter's telephone. Listening in on the telephone, the police heard ex-
tensive discussions of horse race betting and afterwards recorded
other conversations involving a gambling operation. The police used
the information obtained from the eavesdropping to locate the de-
fendants' premises and, following the issuance of a search warrant,
seized money and gambling paraphernalia.
On a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of
the allegedly illegal interceptions, the defendant argued, in effect,
that the police were prohibited by Title III and New Jersey's elec-
tronic surveillance statute"9 from taking advantage of his bad luck.
The New Jersey Superior Court, however, ruled that evidence of the
overheard conversations would not be suppressed since there had
not been a willful interception under either Title III or New Jersey
law. 120 With respect to the conversations overheard by the citizen,
the court found that the citizen's actions had been inadvertent and
unintentional, and thus not within the proscriptions of the federal
and state statutes. 2' As to the eavesdropping by the police, the
court found that the phone was not a "device"'' 22 since the statutory
definition of that term excludes "any telephone . . . furnished to
the subscriber or user by a communication common carrier. . . and
being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its
business . . .. " Consequently, according to the court, the police
use of the phone was not an interception, which, by statute, only
occurs when a communication is aurally acquired by a device.' 21
,, 135 N.J. Super. 81, 342 A.2d 591 (Law Div. 1975).
,, See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-1 to 156A-26 (West 1971 & Supp. 1976).
120 135 N.J. Super. at 89, 342 A.2d at 595.
121 Id. at 87-88, 342 A.2d at 595.
122 Id.
212 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-2d(1) (West 1971); see 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i) (1970).
2 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-2d(1) (West 1971); see 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1970). While
the result in McCartin is satisfying from a law enforcement perspective, the court might more
logically have based its decision upon the common law obligation of the police to investigate
reports of criminal activity, rather than upon a strained interpretation of the statutory defini-
tion of "device." The Tenth Circuit, dealing with the apparent use of an extension telephone
to surreptitiously record a conversation, held that an extension telephone is a device within
the Title III definition when it is used, without consent, to monitor a telephone conversation.
United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346, 351 (10th Cir. 1974). The telephone exclusion within
the definition, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) (1970), was inapposite, the court reasoned, because an
extension utilized for unauthorized monitoring is not being used within the ordinary course
of business of the subscriber. Accord, People v. Tebo, 37 Mich. App. 141, 148-50, 194 N.W.2d
517, 521-22 (1971). Application of this rationale to the McCartin situation would seemingly
require suppression of the evidence of conversations overheard by the police. Since the contin-
[Vol. 51:41
1976] TITLE III
By contrast, in State v. Toomey,'25 a Georgia appellate court,
applying only Georgia law, upheld the suppression of evidence gath-
ered by police in circumstances very similar to McCartin.2" Signifi-
cantly, unlike New Jersey law, the Georgia eavesdropping statute'27
does not exclude a subscriber's telephone which is used in the ordi-
nary course of business from the definition of device.' 28 Thus, the
police officer's nonwarrant use of a citizen's malfunctioning phone
to overhear the defendant's conversations was an unlawful intercep-
tion.'29
These two cases, though decided under different statutory
schemes, are illustrative of the competing values present in the
eavesdropping area. When the initial inadvertent interception re-
veals criminal activity, but the information obtained is insufficient
ued police eavesdropping and recording was not in the ordinary course of business of the
subscriber, the phone would be a device used to intercept a wire communication and the
nonconsensual interception would thus violate 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1970).
Even assuming arguendo the accuracy of the McCartin rather than the Harpel interpre-
tation of device, McCartin is troublesome in that the court did not discuss the fourth and
fourteenth amendment issues engendered by the police activity. At the very least, this activ-
ity, which bears a close resemblance to wiretapping and monitoring on party line telephones,
impinged the defendants' actual expectations of privacy. Whether it also impinged constitu-
tionally justifiable expectations is an open question. See generally Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-79 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
121 134 Ga. App. 343, 214 S.E.2d 421 (1975).
In Id. at 344, 214 S.E.2d at 422. In Toomey, an investigator from the Columbia County
sheriff's office was summoned to investigate the complaint of a local company, Cunningham
Industries, that an unauthorized person had been using its private line to make a number of
phone calls, several of which had involved "drugs, drug parties and the usage of drugs." Id.
After being informed that the defendant was known to have made use of the Cunningham
Industries line to dispatch and receive calls, the investigator eavesdropped on several phone
conversations. The investigator then ascertained the location of the defendant's residence,
swore out a search warrant, and conducted a search, which led to the defendant's arrest for
violating the Georgia drug laws.
' GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3001 to -3010 (1972 & Supp. 1976).
' " GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3009 (1972) defines a device as:
an instrument or apparatus used for overhearing, recording, intercepting or trans-
mitting sounds. . . which involves in its operation electricity, electronics, infrared,
laser or similar beams, but not including merely focusing, lighting, illuminating
equipment, optical magnifying equipment or device commonly referred to as an
"individual hearing aid."
In contradistinction, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-2d(1) (West 1971) excludes from its defini-
tion of an "intercepting device:"
[amny telephone or telegraph instrument . . .furnished to the subscriber or user
by a communication common carrier . . . and being used by the subscriber or user
in the ordinary course of its business; or being used by a communication common
carrier in the ordinary course of its business, or by an investigative or law enforce-
ment officer in the ordinary course of his duties . ..
' 134 Ga. App. at 344, 214 S.E.2d at 422.
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to identify the conversants, a requirement that further investigation
must await the issuance of a wiretap warrant frustrates both the
enforcement of the law and the cooperation between the police and
citizenry. Not only is the citizen deprived of the convenience and
privacy he expects of his telephone service during the waiting
period, 130 but suppression of evidence seized by prompt police
action implies, as the McCartin court noted, "that it was a useless
gesture for this public-spirited citizen to report possible criminal
activity to the police."'' On the other hand, the importance of the
fourth amendment guarantees, including the interposition of "the
deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . between
the citizen and the police,"' 32 bespeaks the need to exercise great
caution in fashioning exceptions to its protection. Resolution of this
problem must ultimately rest on an analysis of the particular facts
and applicable statutes presented in each case, with due regard
given to the interests of the private citizen and the urgency of the
situation. 133 Nonetheless, as a general principle, police should be
permitted to exploit the situation, provided they limit the extent
and duration of the monitoring.
2. The Intentional, Unlawful Interception
In recent years, four state's courts have had to decide whether
law enforcement authorities may use conversations intercepted by
private citizens in violation of state laws either similar to or more
restrictive than Title III. In three of the four cases, such use was
permitted.
'1 It is manifest that the procedures spelled out by Title III and the state laws modeled
on it, while necessary to assure that ex parte wiretaps and eavesdrops are not casually sought
or authorized, are inherently time consuming. In the prosecutor's office for the New York
special narcotics courts, the typical application - admittedly, involving a more complex
showing of probable cause than existed in Toomey - takes at least a week from the initial
drafting to final approval by the district attorney and the judge.
135 N.J. Super. at 87, 342 A.2d at 595.
3 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963).
13 The Toomey decision, requiring an investigation warrant prior to eavesdropping by
the law enforcement official, is unsatisfactory for several reasons. In Toomey, it would have
taken at least a day, perhaps more, to obtain an investigation warrant. During this period
the complaining subscriber, Cunningham Industries, would have been deprived of the con-
venience and privacy it expected from its telephone service. In addition, an authorized wire-
tap under these circumstances would have involved the police in intercepting not only the
defendant's conversations, but also, even if only for a few seconds on each call, the subscri-
ber's, thus invading the latter's legitimate expectations of privacy and doubtless offending
many of the subscriber's employees, customers, and suppliers who would have learned of the
tap only after its termination. Given these circumstances, the action taken by the investigator
in Toomey, i.e., listening to a few telephone calls to confirm the complaint, then obtaining a
search warrant for the defendant's premises, seems entirely proper.
[Vol. 51:41
TITLE III
California prohibits the interception of "confidential communi-
cations" by private citizens unless all parties to the conversation
consent to the interception. 34 Yet, in People v. Ayers,' 35 conversa-
tions intercepted by one party in furtherance of an unlawful scheme
were admitted in a criminal prosecution against the nonconsenting
party. Ayers and his codefendant, Mrs. Popeil, sought to have Mr.
Popeil murdered. They offered the job to two men, and discussed
with them, on a number of occasions, the best method of accom-
plishing their purpose. The two purported killers-for-hire decided
that they would attempt to obtain advance payment and then re-
nege on their part of the bargain. During the negotiations, they
recorded four conversations with Ayers. Subsequently, they re-
ported the matter to the authorities, turned over the tapes, and,
under police supervision, recorded three additional incriminating
conversations. 136
All seven tapes were played at trial and the defendants were
'" CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a) (West 1970); see id. § 631. Communications in furtherance
of certain crimes, however, are specifically-exempted from this broad provision by id. § 633.5,
which states:
Nothing in Section 631 or 632 shall be construed as prohibiting one party to a
confidential communication from recording such communication for the purpose of
obtaining evidence reasonably believed to relate to the commission by another
party to such communication of the crime of extortion, kidnapping, bribery, any
felony involving violence against the person ....
Thus, under § 633.5 one party may record conversations if one of the enumerated criminal
activities is reasonably believed to be involved.
California statutory law also contains another exception to the blanket prohibitions of §
631 and § 632. Under § 633, neither § 631 nor § 632 can be construed as prohibiting the state
attorney general, any district attorney, or any other enumerated official, including police
officers acting under their direction, "from overhearing or recording any communication
which they could lawfully overhear or record prior to the effective date of this chapter." CAL.
PENAL CODE § 633 (West 1970). Prior to this legislation, the law enforcement officials specified
in § 633 could legally eavesdrop when authorized by their department chiefs "or by a district
attorney when such use and installation [were] necessary in the performance of their duties
in detecting crime and in the apprehension of criminals." Act of May 31, 1941, ch. 525, § 1,
1941 Cal. Stats. 1833 (repealed 1967). Section 633 has been termed "a confusing legislative
procedure," and has raised the fear that "by failing to heed the Berger guidelines, [§ 633]
continues the unconstitutional mode of its predecessor." Note, Electronic Surveillance After
Berger, 5 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 107, 130 (1968). It is clear, however, that application of § 633 to
allow government officials to intercept conversations with the consent of one party would not
raise constitutional problems. See note 207 infra.
"1 51 Cal. App. 3d 370, 124 Cal. Rptr. 283 (Ct. App. 1975).
'l Id. at 374, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 286. After the two conspirators agreed to cooperate, several
conversations between one of them and the defendants were recorded with equipment sup-
plied by the police and subsequent meetings were observed and photographed by the police.
As the court noted, "[tihese conversations left no doubt of Eloise and Ayers' intent and
desire to hire someone to murder Samuel Popeil. Eloise said she 'wanted him dead' by any
means and if it was necessary also to kill the maid to put the bodies in bed together." Id.
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convicted. On appeal, the convictions were affirmed and the admis-
sion in evidence of all seven tapes was approved, despite a statutory
provision prohibiting the use of an illegal recording in any judicial
proceeding."' The court reasoned that just as the exclusionary rule
in the constitutional context only operates to deprive the constitu-
tional violator, viz., the government, of the use of the evidence, so
too, in the statutory sphere, this prohibition only operates to deprive
the statutory violator, viz., the private citizen, of the use of the
evidence. Since the government had not engaged in the illegal con-
duct in Ayers, it was not precluded by the statute from introducing
the evidence at trial. In support of this rationale, the court viewed
these private citizen recordings as being within an express excep-
tion 138 to the statutory exclusionary rule that allows a participant to
record conversations and the government to use these recordings if
they were made to obtain evidence of certain enumerated crimes.13
A similar result was reached in People v. Warner,'4l where a
motel switchboard operator deliberately and unlawfully' listened
Id. at 376-77, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 287-88, citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 631(c) (West 1970).
The Ayers court found that the acts of the so-called killers fit within the exception to
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 631-32 (West 1970) carved out by id. § 633.5, which exempts the intercep-
tion or eavesdropping by a party to a conversation which involves one of the particular major
crimes specified in the statute. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 377, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 287-88.
The defendants in Ayers conceded that the recordings obtained by the police after they
were informed of the conspiracy fit within § 633 of the California Penal Code, CAL. PENAL
CODE § 633 (West 1970), discussed in note 134 supra, and argued instead that § 633 was
impliedly repealed by a 1974 amendment to the California Constitution. The court rejected
this contention, finding nothing "that calls into question the validity of the carefully drawn
statutes." 51 Cal. App. 3d at 376, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 287. But cf. Note, Electronic Surveillance
After Berger, 5 SAN DIEGO L. Rav. 107, 130 (1968) (§ 633 violates Berger guidelines).
'31 51 Cal. App. 3d at 377, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 287-88. As further support for its holding,
the court noted that both informers testified at the trial and could have testified to the
conversations preserved on the tapes without violating the defendants' rights. Moreover, since
the police recordings were as harmful to the defendants as those obtained by the informants
prior to police involvement, any error committed in admitting the earlier tapes was harmless.
Id. at 378, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
A similar result was reached in People v. Livingston, 64 Mich. App. 247, 236 N.W.2d 63
(Ct. App. 1975). There, a suspicious husband illegally wiretapped the phone in his home and
discovered that his wife was planning to have him murdered. Noting that the Michigan
legislature had provided certain criminal and civil penalties for violation of the wiretap
statute but had not adopted an exclusionary rule, the court refused to create a barrier to the
admission of evidence obtained by private citizens in violation of the eavesdropping statute.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals of Michigan reversed a lower court's suppression of the
tape. Id. at 255, 236 N.W.2d at 67.
65 Mich. App. 267, 237 N.W.2d 284 (1975).
"' Under Michigan law "any person. . . who wilfully uses any device to eavesdrop upon
[a private] conversation without the consent of all the parties thereto . . . is guilty of a
felony. ... MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 750.539c (1970) (emphasis added). The use or divulgence
of any information which the user knows or reasonably should have known was gathered
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to a lodger's telephone conversation, overheard evidence that the
lodger possessed drugs in her room, and reported the matter to the
police, claiming to have overheard the conversation accidentally.
Based on this lead, the police quickly accumulated additional evi-
dence, seized the contraband, and arrested the defendant in the
motel room. After noting in passing that the lower court had held
that the defendant was not an aggrieved person under Title I, the
Court of Appeals of Michigan, applying only state law, reversed the
lower court's suppression of the conversation and dismissal of the
action. The court stated that because the police did not know that
the call had been illegally intercepted, they could use the informa-
tion as the basis of further investigation. Consequently, the arrest
and seizure were lawful. 42
In contrast to the result reached in Michigan and California, a
Florida court, applying an eavesdropping statute' almost identical
to Title I, held that a private citizen's testimony concerning a
conversation she had overheard on an extension phone must be
suppressed when the eavesdropping was neither consented to by a
party to the conversation nor authorized by the telephone subscri-
ber."4 In Horn v. State,' a woman, who admitted she was simply
"being nosy," had listened on an extension telephone to a conversa-
tion between a coworker and the latter's husband; shortly there-
illegally is also a felony. Id. § 750.539e.
"1 65 Mich. App. at 274-75, 237 N.W.2d at 287-88. In People v. Livingston, 64 Mich. App.
247, 236 N.W.2d 63 (Ct. App. 1975), discussed in note 139 supra, the court held that evidence
obtained in violation of the Michigan eavesdropping statute, but not in violation of either
the state or Federal Constitutions should not be suppressed since the legislature had not
adopted an exclusionary rule. The combined effect of Livingston and Warner, which at least
intimates that a police officer may not knowingly use illegal eavesdropping evidence, is to
allow the prosecuting attorney to introduce the evidence in court but to deny a police officer
the use of that evidence in his investigations.
"' FLA. STAT. § 934.01-.10 (1973 & Supp. 1976).
Horn v. State, 298 So. 2d 194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). The nonconsent of the
subscriber was particularly important in Horn since the eavesdropping involved the surrepti-
tious use of an extension phone. Under Florida law, as under Title II, violation of the
statutory scheme and hence the exclusion of evidence rests upon a determination that an oral
or wire communication has been intercepted through the use of a device. The essential
question in Horn was whether the telephone extension was a device. As defined by the statute,
an extension phone is not a device unless it is being used outside the ordinary course of the
subscriber's business. FLA. STAT. § 934.02(4)(a) (1973). In Horn, the court held that the
unauthorized use of the extension was outside the subscriber's ordinary course of business
and thus illegal. 298 So. 2d at 198, citing United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346 (10th Cir.
1974). Therefore, the evidence was obtained illegally and had been wrongfully admitted at
trial.
,. 298 So. 2d 194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
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after, the coworker was murdered and her husband arrested for the
crime. At trial, the "nosy" woman testified to what she had heard,
testimony which constituted circumstantial evidence of the defen-
dant's guilt. Finding this evidence prejudicial, the appellate court
reversed, holding that the clear language of the statute compelled
the conclusion that testimony concerning this illegal surveillance
was not admissible in evidence.'
Perhaps the most unique case in this area, with respect to both
the facts and the ingenuity of the court's rationale, was decided by
the Supreme Court of Washington. In State v. Smith,'47 the defen-
dant, a burglary detective, had arrested one Kyreacos. Ellich, the
complaining witness in the Kyreacos prosecution, was murdered
shortly before trial, and Kyreacos was suspected in the killing. Some
days later Kyreacos received an anonymous phone call about the
Ellich homicide; the caller invited Kyreacos to meet him in an alley.
After equipping himself with a concealed tape recorder, Kyreacos
kept the appointment and met the defendant, who shot and killed
him. At the defendant's trial for homicide, he admitted shooting
Kyreacos but claimed that the latter had had a gun and that he,
Smith, had acted in self-defense. The state, however, produced the
tape recorder Kyreacos had been wearing, a tape which proved that
Smith had committed murder.
Washington had recently enacted a statute which provides that
no one, including the state, can "intercept, record or divulge any
S. . [p]rivate conversation, by any device . ..without first ob-
taining the consent of all the persons engaged in the conversa-
tion." ' Nevertheless, the court ruled that the recording was pro-
"' Id. at 198-99. In denying the state's petition for a rehearing, the court emphasized that
it had not balanced the crime of murder against the crime of eavesdropping and determined
that the scale tipped toward the latter. Rather, the court felt it had "passed upon admissibil-
ity of evidence and not upon comparability of crimes." Id. at 201. The court also declared
the state's contention that the eavesdropping was purely private conduct and not within the
constitutional prohibitions against infringement of the right of privacy to be inapposite to the
court's decision. The court emphasized that its decision had not been based on the Constitu-
tion, but had rested "upon the clear language of Chapter 934 Florida Statutes." Id. Finally,
the court dismissed the argument that prior law supported the admissibility in criminal but
not civil cases of evidence obtained by an illegal eavesdrop. Id.
" 85 Wash. 2d 840, 540 P.2d 424 (1975) (en banc).
WASH. REv. CoDE § 9.73.030 (1974). Washington statutory law includes only three
exceptions to the exclusionary rule formulated in § 9.73.030: the activities of a communica-
tions common carrier in connection with providing services, id. § 9.73.070; the recording of
incoming emergency phone calls by police and fire personnel, id. § 9.73.090(1); and the video
and audio recording by the police of the activities of individuals in custody, id. § 9.73.090(2).
Even if the evidence is within these exceptions, its admissibility is somewhat questionable.
See State v. Wanrow, 14 Wash. App. 115, 538 P.2d 849 (1975) (recording of emergency phone
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perly admitted, since "the events here involved do not comprise
'private conversation' within the meaning of the statute. Gunfire,
running, shouting, and Kyreacos' screams do not constitute
'conversation' . "..."149 The justification for the court's conclusion
is readily apparent from an examination of the facts. 5 ' In order to
reach this conclusion, however, the court was forced, by the absolute
nature of the statutory exclusionary rule, to employ a rationale
which can, at best, be termed doubtful.
The purpose of the judicially created exclusionary rule is the
protection of society from overreaching by the state, even at the
expense of suppressing important evidence or returning a criminal,
unpunished, to society.'' Applied to state action, the rule is an
imperfect, but usually effective, means of safeguarding individual
rights. An extension of the exclusionary rule to the isolated acts of
private individuals, however, accomplishes no articulable social
end, provided private citizens do not engage in widespread eaves-
dropping to "help" the police. Thus, the courts have consistently
refused to so extend the rule. 152
The legislative adoption of an absolute exclusionary rule is
similarly of questionable merit. This is illustrated by the ration-
call to police inadmissible). To ensure admissibility, a warrant must be obtained prior to the
interception of any conversation. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.040 (1974).
M' 85 Wash. 2d at 846, 540 P.2d at 428. Presumably, had Smith merely threatened
Kyreacos, extorted money from him, or solicited his participation in unlawful acts, the tape
would have been inadmissible as a recording of "private conversation." See State v. Wanrow,
14 Wash. App. 115, 538 P.2d 849 (1975).
'" The corroborating testimony of several prosecution witnesses in Smith, coupled with
the clear reproduction of the fatal event on the tape, strongly indicated the defendant's guilt.
85 Wash. 2d at 847-48, 540 P.2d at 428. Even the dissenting judge recognized the existence
of overwhelming proof and stated that it would "seem incredible that evidence as plainly
probative as this tape recording would be unusable in a criminal trial." Id. at 857, 540 P.2d
at 434 (Utter, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, Judge Utter refused to join the court's holding
that the tape was not within the exclusionary umbrella of Washington law. Although agreeing
that the tape contained more than normal conversation, he found that its basic content was
conversation and hence it fell within the statutory proscription. Id. at 858, 540 P.2d at 434.
'51 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505 (1961).
"I See note 113 and accompanying text supra. In most states, it is a crime for a private
citizen to intentionally intercept the communications of others. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 631-632 (West 1970); FLA. STAT. § 934.03 (1973 & Supp. 1976); MICH. Comp. LAWS §
750.539c (1970); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030 (1974). The victims of such interceptions may
sue the eavesdropper either in state court pursuant to the applicable statute or in federal
court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970). Such provisions seem sufficient to deter wide-
spread unlawful interceptions by private citizens. In those rare instances in which an unlaw-
ful private interception reveals the commission of a crime by those whose conversations are
intercepted, prosecutors and the courts must decide, as they are frequently called upon to
do in other contexts, which offender to pursue and which to immunize from prosecution.
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ales of Warner and Smith and the decision in Horn. Certainly the
unlawful interceptions by the coworker and the motel operator
violated the defendants' expectations of privacy; 113 certainly if those
conversations had been intercepted by or at the request of the
police, the fruits of the interceptions should have been suppressed.
But to bar law enforcement officials from making use of these
private interceptions could lead to absurd results even if, as in
Warner, the prohibition is limited to knowing use. For example,
should a motel operator unlawfully overhear a telephone call, in
which a lodger was telling a co-conspirator that "I am going to kill
our hostage if you do not receive the ransom in five minutes," and
then, admitting the illegality of the interception, report what he
heard to the police, under the rationale of Warner, the police
would have no right to enter the room in time to save the victim.
Undoubtedly, the police would do so; however, Warner would
most likely render the kidnapper-attempted murderer immune
from prosecution without deterring future illegal electronic surveil-
lance. Such a result would hold the law up to contempt, and de-
servedly so.
In the area of private, unlawful interceptions, which unques-
tionably are invasions of privacy, the appropriate redress lies in the
creation of meaningful civil remedies which can be pursued by an
aggrieved person.'54 Additionally, the proper deterrent to such activ-
ity is the imposition and enforcement of criminal sanctions and the
exclusion of any evidence gathered when the utilization of that evi-
dence would benefit the illicit eavesdropper. ' Penalizing the gov-
" See Horn v. State, 298 So. 2d 194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); People v. Warner, 65
Mich. App. 267, 237 N.W.2d 287 (1975). In Horn, not only the defendant's expectation of
privacy, but the murder victim's as well would have been violated.
'' Many states allow the recovery of damages in a civil action for the violation of their
privacy statutes, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.2 (West 1970); FLA. STAT. § 934.10 (1973).
Indeed, some states allow recovery for mental pain and suffering, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE §
9.73.060 (1974), punitive damages, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 934.10(2) (1973); MICH. CoMP. LAWS §
750.539h(c) (1970), and reasonable attorneys' fees, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 934.10(3) (1973). Fur-
thermore, some jurisdictions set up a minimum recovery for the violation of their eavesdrop-
ping statutes. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.2(1) (West 1970) ($3000); FLA. STAT. §
934.10(1) (1973) ($100 per day for each day of violation but not less than $1000).
" The California eavesdropping statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a) (West 1970), provides
an excellent illustration of the use of criminal sanctions to deter private eavesdropping.
Section 632 imposes a fine of up to $2500 and a jail term of up to three years for the illegal
eavesdropping upon or recording of a private communication. Id. A recidivist under this
statute, is confronted with a maximum fine of $10,000 and possible imprisonment of up to
five years. Id. With respect to preventing the private eavesdropper from benefiting by his
actions, the court in People v. Ayers, 51 Cal. App. 3d 370, 124 Cal. Rptr. 283 (Ct. App. 1975),
found that the California statutory scheme restrains private citizens "by denying to the
violators of those sections any personal benefit from the evidence so obtained but not neces-
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ernment and, in turn, society itself by forbidding the use of this
unsolicited evidence in the enforcement of the criminal laws, how-
ever, will not deter the private citizen, who is not under the govern-
ment's direct control, and can only benefit the avowed law-
breaker." 6
DEFINING CONSENT
Title III authorizes nonwarrant, government interceptions
when "one of the parties to the communication has given prior
consent to such interception."5 7 The insistence upon prior consent
may be traced to Weiss v. United States,15 where the government
had utilized a concededly unlawful wiretap to intercept communi-
cations between Weiss and a co-conspirator, and then used the evi-
dence obtained from the wiretap to force the co-conspirator to turn
informer against Weiss and to consent to the divulgence of the ille-
gally intercepted conversation. Suppressing this evidence, the Su-
preme Court declared that the authorization obtained in this case
was not "consent" under section 605 of the Communications Act of
1934.'11 The incorporation of the Weiss prior consent requirement
sarily (preventing] the government from making use thereof." Id. at 376-77, 124 Cal. Rptr.
at 287. See also Pennington v. State, 19 Md. App. 253, 310 A.2d 817 (Ct. App. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1019 (1974); People v. Livingston, 64 Mich. App. 247, 236 N.W.2d 63 (1975).
Interestingly, the deterrent effect of the constitutional exclusionary rule in criminal prosecu-
tions, which rule focuses directly on government action, has recently been subjected to in-
creasing criticism. Chief Justice Burger has emphasized that despite "the high price it ex-
tracts from society-the release of countless guilty criminals"-it has not been shown that
the exclusionary "rule actually deters illegal conduct of law enforcement officials." Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). One com-
mentator, examining empirical evidence indicating the rule's lack of progress toward its
asserted goal, viz., deterrence, has concluded that it should be replaced with a traditional
tort remedy against culpable police officials. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. Rav. 665 (1970). See generally Foote, Tort Remedies for Police
Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. Rv. 479 (1955). Given the increasing doubt
surrounding the traditional exclusionary rule in criminal prosecutions, an extension of that
rule to cover statutory violations and to encompass acts of private citizens as well as those of
government officials appears to be unwise.
"I See People v. Ayers, 51 Cal. App. 3d 370, 376, 124 Cal. Rptr. 283, 287 (Ct. App. 1975);
note 155 supra.
,"1 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1970). See text accompanying note 13 supra. The constitution-
ality of nonwarrant consensual interceptions was upheld in United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745 (1971), discussed in notes 22-46 and accompanying text supra, and by subsequent deci-
sions of the 11 courts of appeals, see notes 48-50 and accompanying text supra.
' 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
' ' Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934) (current version at
47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970)). Section 605 requires the authorization of the sender in order to
intercept and divulge any wire communication. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970). In Weiss, the Court
stated that the term "authorization" contemplated "voluntary consent." 308 U.S. at 330.
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into Title III precludes the use of the illegally obtained evidence to
coerce a victim into ratifying the unlawful eavesdropping. '
Although Title III does specify when the consent must be ob-
tained, it neither defines this term, assigns the burden of proof, or
indicates what that burden is to be. When the consenting partici-
pant is an undercover police officer, a paid informant, a crime vic-
tim seeking redress or protection, or a public-spirited citizen, a find-
ing of voluntary consent is almost automatic. However, when the
consenting party is one who himself has been apprehended by law
enforcement officials and has been persuaded to cooperate by the
threat of prosecution or the promise of leniency, several questions
arise. Do these factors render an informer's consent to interception
coerced and therefore involuntary? Is the burden and standard of
proving consent to interception the same as that required to estab-
lish consent to a search of a person or premises? If the informer is
unavailable or unwilling to testify, or simply is not called as a wit-
ness, how will this effect a determination of whether or not his
consent was voluntary? These issues are discussed herein.
The Supreme Court has said little on the subject, and what it
has said related to section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934
and not Title III. While Weiss held the co-conspirator's consent
involuntary because, inter alia, it was given "in the hope of le-
niency,"'"' the blatant illegality of the interception, which itself
provided the evidence used to force the co-conspirator's coopera-
tion, distinguishes Weiss from the subsequent cases reaching the
issue of consent. Although at least one court has analyzed Rathbun
v. United States ' 2 as implicitly endorsing the concept that a pro-
mise of leniency to an apprehended criminal does not necessarily
vitiate the voluntariness of the informer's consent,' 3 such endorse-
ment, if intended, was mere dictum. In On Lee,'6' where the in-
' "Retroactive authorization, however, would not be possible. (Weiss v. United States,
308 U.S. 321 (1939)). ... S. REP., supra note 2 at 94, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. at
2182.
,' 308 U.S. at 330-31.
182 355 U.S. 107 (1957). In Rathbun, the Court held that evidence of a conversation
obtained by two officers who listened on a telephone extension with the consent of one of the
parties did not violate § 605 of the Communications Act. Although Congress had not explic-
itly created this consensual exception, the Court reasoned that an interception, the act
prohibited by the statute, did not occur in the facts presented. Id. at 109.
6I United States v. Zarkin, 250 F. Supp. 728, 733-44 (D.D.C. 1966), citing Rathbun v.
United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957). The Zarkin analysis, however, is suspect. The Zarkin
court stated that Rathbun had ratified, by citation in a footnote, certain lower court decisions
approving police prompting of an informant. Examination of the cases cited by the Rathbun
Court, however, reveals that generally these cases are silent on this question.
6I See notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra.
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former did not testify at trial, the nature of the informer's consent
was not raised; in White,'65 the Court declined to discuss the issue. ' 5
Since White, certiorari has been denied in all consensual eavesdrop-
ping cases.
Consent: Burden of Proof, The Absent Informer, and the Question
of Coercion
Almost without exception, the burden of establishing a partici-
pant's consent to the interception of a conversation is placed upon
the prosecution. ' Most courts have held that a failure to call the
informer, or an inability to produce him, does not necessarily re-
quire a finding of no consent which would mandate the suppression
of the evidence. To the contrary, the officers who were with and
supervised the informer when the conversations were intercepted
are permitted to testify that the informer consented to the intercep-
tions, and such testimony is generally sufficient to establish the
voluntariness of the absent informer's consent. '
" See text accompanying notes 33-46 supra.
' The White Court stated: "White argues that Jackson [the informer], though admit-
tedly 'cognizant' of the presence of transmitting devices on his person, did not voluntarily
consent thereto. Because the court below did not reach the issue of Jackson's consent, we
decline to do so." 401 U.S. at 747 n.1. On remand, the Seventh Circuit, since the defendant
had not raised the issue earlier, likewise declined to consider the voluntariness of the consent.
454 F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 962 (1972).
"I, Cf. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (prosecutor has burden of proving
consent to search of premises); United States v. Napier, 451 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1971) (dictum)
(under § 605 of Communications Act of 1934, prosecution has burden of proving voluntary
consent). See also United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Miley,
513 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 842 (1975); United States v. Agosto, 502 F.2d
612 (9th Cir. 1974); Bradley v. Cowan, 500 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Garcia,
496 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 960 (1975). The voluntariness of the
consent may be challenged by a defendant who was either a party to the monitored conversa-
tion or the target of the interception, see 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) (1970), in his motion to suppress
this evidence as unlawful under Title I. See id. § 2518(10)(a).
I' See United States v. James, 495 F.2d 434 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 899 (1974)
(informant murdered shortly before trial); United States v. Rangel, 488 F.2d 871 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 984 (1974) (informant was "unavailable"); United States v. Lemonakis,
485 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974) (informant committed suicide
shortly before trial); United States ex rel. Seaman v. Cryan, 329 F. Supp. 875 (D.N.J. 1971)
(informant available, but not called as a witness by the government). In all of these cases,
after the intercepting officers testified that the informant had consented to the interception,
the conversations were held admissible. See also United States v. Ransom, 515 F.2d 885 (5th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Palazzo, 488 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Bonanno,
487 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1973). But see Tollett v. State, 272 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1973), wherein the
court ruled that absent the testimony of the consenting party, intercepted conversations will
be excluded from evidence. In that case, the informer had allegedly consented to the intercep-
tion of four telephone conversations with the defendant while the informer was incarcerated
in the county jail. A police captain testified to the informer's consent, but the informer was
not called and no evidence was offered concerning his unavailability. The Florida Supreme
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A more difficult question arises when the informer's consent is
attacked as coerced because it was motivated by a threat of prosecu-
tion or the possibility of leniency. The overwhelming majority of
courts that have considered this issue, however, have held that con-
sent under these circumstances is not necessarily involuntary."9
Indeed, United States v. Laughlin'7 ° is the only reported federal
decision in which intercepted conversations were suppressed on the
basis of coerced consent. There, the District Court for the District
of Columbia, relying on the cooperating witness' testimony that she
had not wanted to make a taped phone call but had done so in an
effort to avoid indictment for perjury, found that this consent was
coerced and therefore involuntary.' 71 While the facts in Laughlin
provide strong evidence that the informer cooperated against her
Court suppressed the conversations and ordered a new trial, three judges dissenting. Accord,
State v. Muscara, 334 So. 2d 167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). See also Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) (Warren, C.J., concurring), discussed in note 45 supra. One commen-
tator has observed that cross-examination "may be essential in establishing the context in
which the statements were made" because an examination of the agent who received the
transmission often will be fruitless, due to the agent's lack of direct knowledge of the nature
of any previous meetings between the informer and the defendant. Note, Eavesdropping,
Informers, and the Right of Privacy: A Judicial Tightrope, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 975, 982-83
(1967). Moreover, establishing the defense of entrapment, which may be the only defense
available due to the conclusive nature of the recordings, may depend to a great extent on the
availability of the informer for cross-examination.
,U See, e.g., United States v. Bastone, 526 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S.
Ct. 2172 (1976); United States v. Rich, 518 F.2d 980 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Lipp-
man, 492 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975); United States v.
Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974); United States
v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 823 (1973); Good v. United States,
378 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Zarkin, 250 F. Supp. 728 (D.D.C. 1966); Thrush
v. State, 515 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). All these cases involve defendants who
allowed their conversations with other offenders to be intercepted in exchange for promises
of leniency or immunity. See also Kerr v. State, 256 Ark. 738, 512 S.W.2d 13 (1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975); People v. Velasquez, 54 Cal. App. 3d 695, 126 Cal. Rptr. 656
(Ct. App. 1976); Cauley v. State, 130 Ga. App. 278, 203 S.E.2d 239 (1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 877 (1974); People v. Holliman, 22 111. App. 3d 95, 316 N.E.2d 812 (1974); Moore v. State,
291 So. 2d 187 (Miss. 1974); Everett v. State, 248 So. 2d 439 (Miss.). Some of these opinions
specify that the informants agreed to cooperate in the hope of receiving leniency but without
receiving any promises to that effect. Some of these cases do not discuss what arrangements,
if any, had been made between the informant and the authorities.
110 222 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1963). Appellate courts have occasionally remanded for
additional hearings on the voluntariness issue. See United States v. Napier, 451 F.2d 552 (5th
Cir. 1971); State v. Del Monaco, 165 Conn. 163, 328 A.2d 672 (1973); People v. Patrick, 46
Mich. App. 678, 208 N.W.2d 604 (1973).
"' The government did not appeal the suppression of the tapes. Instead, it brought a new
indictment, litigated the admissibility of the tapes anew before a different district judge,
received a favorable ruling, and then used the tapes at trial. The court of appeals ruled that
the government was collaterally estopped from relitigating the consent issue and suppressed
the tapes without reaching the merits of the original district court decision. United States v.
Laughlin, 344 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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will, '72 the result, nonetheless, appears ill advised. In United States
v. Jones, 73 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
confronted with the coercion issue under more normal circumstan-
ces, reversed a finding of involuntariness. In Jones, the defendant
and an attorney named Bromley both perjured themselves before a
federal grand jury. Upon learning that the government was prepar-
ing to prosecute him on a number of charges, Bromley, after consult-
ing with counsel, agreed to cooperate, and permitted the govern-
ment to record both telephone and face-to-face conversations be-
tween himself and the defendant in the hope, but without any cer-
tainty, of obtaining some leniency."' On a motion to suppress these
recordings, the district court found that Bromley's consent had been
coerced by the "constant presence" of government officials and
Bromley's fears of "indictment, loss of his job, and the eventual
foreclosure of the mortgage on his home."17 5 Reversing, the circuit
court "[looked] only to what the concept of voluntariness has ordi-
narily been understood to involve in order to conclude that Brom-
ley's repeated manifestations of consent were not nugatory in this
instance. 1 7
Adopting a similar approach, the Court of Appeals for the
,72 A grand jury witness agreed to make a telephone call to the defendant and to permit
the government to tape it after the following exchange in the grand jury between the witness,
Mrs. Gross; the prosecutor, Mr. Sullivan; and the deputy foreman of the grand jury:
[Mr. Sullivan:] The only possible way of'getting the people who are putting up
the money and instigating the plans of this operation is by the cooperation of
someone who is in between. . .. We need Mrs. Gross' cooperation and the Grand
Jury's decision as to whether they would indict you for the perjury you committed
this morning would be largely determined by the measure of your cooperation.
[Mrs. Gross:] I realize your point but I say I would rather not. If I did not have
to I would rather not. If I had to I would. There is nothing I can do.
DEPUTY FOREMAN: If we don't get cooperation and can't get those [behind
the over-all operation] we'll get the ones we can . . . . We prefer the big ones but
if they make it impossible for us to get the big ones we'll get the little ones.
222 F. Supp. at 267. In suppressing the recordings, the Laughlin court found support for its
holding in Weiss V. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939), discussed in notes 158-61 and accom-
panying text supra.
'7 433 F.2d 1176 (D.C.Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950 (1971). The Fourth Circuit
reads Jones as superceding Laughlin. United States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213, 229 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 823 (1973).
'T, 433 F.2d at 1177. The court noted that Bromley, in fact, never was indicted. Id. n.4.
' Id. at 1180, quoting 292 F. Supp. 1001, 1008-09.
178 "It is certainly true," the court concluded, "that people who testify falsely before
grand juries do not find themselves in the happiest of conditions, and are under the necessity
of taking thought for the future. But that hardly means that a decision to tell the truth and
cooperate with the authorities is thereby coerced or involuntary in any meaningful sense."
Id. The Jones court did not refer to Laughlin.
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Third Circuit in United States v. Osser177 framed the consent issue
as "whether the consent was voluntary and uncoerced, not whether
the motivations for it were altruistic or self-seeking."'78 The court
carefully distinguished Laughlin, noting that in Osser "[n]o im-
plied threats were made" to the cooperating witness, who testified
"that he did not feel pressured by the Government request" that he
allow his conversations to be taped "and that he believed his prom-
ised immunity would be forthcoming whether or not he con-
sented."179
Even where the inducements to cooperate have gone beyond a
promise of immunity or leniency, an informer's consent has none-
theless been upheld as valid. In United States v. Franks,'o a prose-
cution for illegal use of explosives, taped conversations between the
defendants and several government informers were admitted into
evidence. On appeal, one defendant challenged the consent of the
informer, claiming:
Davis has a long criminal record and had numerous charges pend-
ing against him. The Government placed him under full protective
custody, gave him an extremely nice apartment for he [sic] and
his girlfriend, provided him with a living allowance, secured for his
use a new Cadillac automobile and gave him other special consid-
erations. Additionally, Davis was never tried for or sentenced for
any of the crimes of which he was charged prior to his agreement
to cooperate with the Government.'8'
Without discussing the truth of these allegations, the court simply
commented: "We find, however, sufficient consent to shield the
government recordings. 1 82
In United States v. Palazzo,"' wherein an arrested defendant
agreed to make a monitored phone call only after the government
had violated several of his constitutional rights, his consent was
nonetheless held to be valid.'84 Finally, even where the informer
.7" 483 F.2d 727 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1028 (1973).
483 F.2d at 730.
Id. The promise of immunity was given to the informer before he decided to cooperate
with the government. Moreover, when the informer was asked to consent to a tape recording
of a telephone conversation with the defendant, he was informed that his promised immunity
would not be affected by his decision. Id. at 729.
511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
511 F.2d at 31, quoting Brief for Defendant Mitchell.
IZ 511 F.2d at 31.
" 488 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1974).
Palazzo, the "consenting" participant to a taped phone call, had been arrested after
an illegal search of his luggage had revealed marijuana. Although he had asked to consult
with an attorney, he was kept incommunicado for nearly two hours, and finally agreed to
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testified that he did not consent to the interception of his conversa-
tions, consent was nonetheless found in United States v. Ransom. I'l
If Franks, Palazzo, and Ransom are any indication, the concept
that a coerced consent renders the intercepted conversation inad-
missible is losing whatever force it may have had. Few courts, how-
ever, have articulated the definition or standard of consent which
apparently underlies such decisions.
The Bonanno Test: Knowledge Equals Consent
What most federal and state courts seem to be saying impli-
citly, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made explicit in
United States v. Bonanno.58 There, Spiros Dendrinos agreed to co-
operate with the government after he had been arrested for selling
counterfeit money to a Secret Service agent. Dendrinos made a
phone call from Secret Service headquarters to the defendant, who
agreed to sell Dendrinos $5200 in counterfeit twenty dollar bills for
$1250. An agent monitored and recorded the call. Shortly thereafter
the defendant met Dendrinos, passed him the counterfeit money,
and was arrested.
At a suppression hearing, a Secret Service agent'87 testified that
Dendrinos had agreed to the taping of the telephone call and that
the taping and monitoring equipment was physically and visibly
attached to the phone on which Dendrinos made the call. Defense
counsel then called Dendrinos as a witness; Dendrinos "promptly
make a taped phone call to Viagran, the person who had sold him the marijuana. Palazzo
and Viagran were tried jointly, and the seized marijuana and taped conversations were
admitted in evidence. On appeal from their convictions, the Fifth Circuit reversed Palazzo's
conviction, holding that the marijuana had been seized illegally and was, therefore, inadmis-
sible against Palazzo. As a result of this determination, the court found it unnecessary to rule
on the propriety of using the tape against the consenting party. Id. at 944-45. As to Viagran,
however, the court held that he lacked standing to object to the use of the marijuana, id. at
947-48, and further stated that Palazzo's consent was sufficient to legitimize the recording of
the phone conversation, id. at 948.
1" 515 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1975). At the suppression hearing, a police officer testified that
the informer had consented to the interception of his conversation with the defendant. The
informer took the stand and denied having consented. "Faced with this credibility choice,
the district court concluded that. . . [the informer] consented. This conclusion is supported
by the evidence and it must stand. Id. at 890.
" 487 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1973).
" The agent who actually monitored and taped the call was not available to testify,
having been assigned to guard John F. Kennedy, Jr., then in Mexico. Another agent, present
at the taping, testified to the circumstances under which the tape was made. The court
acknowledged that "[w]hile it would have been preferable for the Government to have called
[the monitoring agent] to testify to Dendrinos' consent, there is no rule requiring the produc-
tion of the best witness." Id. at 659.
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claimed the privilege against self-incrimination with respect to
practically all questions and specifically those concerning the tele-
phone call and his consent to its being monitored and recorded."' 88
Nonetheless, the trial court ruled that Dendrinos had consented to
the interception of the phone call. In upholding that ruling, the
Second Circuit expressed what most other courts, faced with similar
issues, had only implied:
We observe at the outset that the extent of proof required to show
that an informer consented to the monitoring or recording of a
telephone call is normally quite different from that needed to show
consent to a physical search whether by the defendant himself or
by some person in a position to give an effective one. . . . In cases
involving physical search, the person alleged to have consented is
doing something apparently contrary to his own interests or to
those of another who often is in some way connected with him. An
informer's consent to the monitoring or recording of a telephone
conversation is an incident to a course of cooperation with law
enforcement officials on which he has ordinarily decided some time
previously and entails no unpleasant consequences to him. Hence,
it will normally suffice for the Government to show that the in-
former went ahead with a call after knowing what the law enforce-
ment officers were about.
There is nothing to impeach the judge's ruling under this easy
test . ... 168
The logic of the Second Circuit's analysis is compelling and is
supported on two additional grounds. First, it is not uncommon for
a defendant to become an informer because he faces severe penalties
for his own crimes if he does not cooperate and has been promised
or hopes to receive leniency' 0 if he does cooperate. Often that coop-
'" Id. at 656. It developed that Dendrinos' unwillingness to testify was probably "due as
much to fear of physical violence as to worry about self-incrimination." Id. After learning that
Dendrinos had also taken methadone just before the hearing, the trial judge apparently
concluded that Dendrinos was not competent to testify, and suggested to counsel that neither
side call him as a witness at trial; both sides agreed not to do so. Id.
I" Id. at 658-59 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The court added that Dendrinos'
consent was established even if measured by a "more stringent" test, since he had agreed to
arrange a meeting between an undercover agent and Bonanno before making the phone call.
The court's rationale is further supported by the fact that Dendrinos made the purchase of
counterfeit money for the agents after the phone call. Finally, the court observed that Dendri-
nos' drug use on the day of the hearing, see note 188 supra, "which, in the judge's view, made
him of dubious competence as a trial witness, has no tendency to show he was in a similar
condition on the night of the telephone call." 487 F.2d at 659.
I" Defendants have also challenged the consent when the informer has received "other
special considerations." See United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 31 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
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eration will include undercover activity - meeting with the targets
of an investigation, purchasing contraband from them, drawing
them into conversation about past or present crimes, and learning
first hand about their illegal acts. 9' Very often the informer is called
upon to testify about his undercover activities in prosecutions based
upon those activities. Such testimony is admissible.'92
Given that an informer's testimony concerning his undercover
activities is admissible, even if those activities and that testimony
might have been coerced by threats of punishment or promises of
leniency, it is illogical to suppress tape recordings of his undercover
activities on the ground that his consent to the interception and
recording of those activities was similarly coerced. 9 ' Additionally,
if a trial is a search for the truth, it runs contrary to the interests of
justice to put an informer on the stand and ask a jury to determine
the credibility of his testimony while denying the jury access to the
best evidence of the true facts.'94
The merit of the Bonanno consent test is further indicated by
its consistency with congressional intent. Congress sought to main-
tain the existing law on standing to raise a motion to suppress'95 by
M' Use of informers as undercover operatives is, of course, particularly vital in investiga-
tions into organized crime, narcotics traffic, political corruption, and bribery.
M92 In Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), discussed in note 17 supra, the Su-
preme Court rejected a "general attack upon the use of a government informer" as an under-
cover operative and witness, even where "the risk that [the informer's] testimony might be
perjurious is very high." 385 U.S. at 311. While it is "quite correct" that an informer may
have a substantial motive to lie, "it does not follow that his testimony [is] untrue, nor does
it follow that his testimony [is] constitutionally inadmissible. The established safeguards
of the Anglo-American legal system leave the veracity of a witness to be tested by cross-
examination, and the credibility of his testimony to be determined by a properly instructed
jury." Id.
"I One can, of course, hypothesize tactics and pressures so shocking and outrageous (e.g.,
physical torture, threats to fabricate a case against an innocent loved one) that justice might
mandate suppression, not only of tape recordings, but of the informer's testimony as well.
But to the author, it is neither outrageous nor shocking for the authorities in effect to say to
an offender: "Cooperate, testify, and let us tape your conversations so the jury will recognize
the truth, and we will make life as pleasant for you as circumstances permit; otherwise we
will seek the maximum penalties against you the law allows."
M,' See text accompanying note 252 infra. A conscientious prosecutor would prefer to
record an informer's conversations even if the tapes were inadmissible, to assure that his
witness' testimony will be, not only "helpful," but also truthful. Tape recordings can consti-
tute as powerful evidence of innocence as of guilt.
" S. REP., supra note 2, at 91, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. at 2179-80, citing, inter
alia, Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942). "Fourth Amendment rights are personal
rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted." Brown
v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230 (1973) (standing to seek suppression of physical evidence).
In Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), the Court declared that a person's fourth
amendment rights are violated when he is a party to an unlawfully intercepted conversation
or when he is the owner of the premises within which the unlawful interception is perpetrated.
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allowing anyone whose conversations were intercepted or who was
the target of the interception to move for suppression under Title
III.'"9 There is, however, no indication that Congress intended a
defendant to win suppression of his incriminating res gestae state-
ments by showing that a co-conspirator succumbed to lawful, albeit
intense, pressure to cooperate. Rather, the legislative design envi-
sioned the use, consistent with safeguarding "the privacy of inno-
cent persons," 9 ' of eavesdropping, both consensual and ex parte, to
investigate and apprehend, in particular, "organized criminals" -
the class of offenders against whom such pressure tactics to recruit
informers and obtain cooperation are most often needed. ' The
Bonanno definition of consent is consistent with this intent; '" under
Consequently, the Court held that a defendant in either instance would have standing to
object to the use against him of evidence obtained through the illegal eavesdropping. Id. at
176.
t, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) (1970) defines "aggrieved person" as "a person who was a party
to any intercepted oral or wire communication or a person against whom the interception was
directed." Id. § 2518(10)(a) provides that "[a]ny aggrieved person .. .may move to sup-
press the contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived there-
from, on the grounds that - (i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted .... " In
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), the Court stated that "Congress has provided
only that an 'aggrieved person' may move to suppress the contents of a wire or oral communi-
cation intercepted in violation of the Act [Title III]. . . .The Act's legislative history
indicates that 'aggrieved person,'. . . should be construed in accordance with existing stand-
ing rules." Id. at 175 n.9. See also United States v. Ahmad, 347 F. Supp. 912 (M.D. Pa. 1972),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d
171 (3d Cir. 1973).
" The congressional findings which accompany Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 states that "[t]o safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the
interception of wire or oral communications where none of the parties to the communications
has consented to the interception should be allowed only when authorized by a court of
competent jurisdiction ...." Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, ch. 119,
tit. III, § 801(d), 82 Stat. 211.
"I The congressional findings introducing Title III state in part:
Organized criminals make extensive use of wire and oral communications in their
criminal activities. The interception of such communications to obtain evidence of
the commission of crimes or to prevent their commission is an indispensible aid to
law enforcement and the administration of justice.
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, ch. 119, tit. III, § 801(c), 82 Stat. 211.
"' The Bonanno test should be inapplicable, however, if the prosecution seeks to use the
interception against the party who consented, since in this instance the informer is apparently
waiving his fourth and fifth amendment rights. The appropriate standard here should be
either the consent necessary for a search of premises or person, or a knowing and intelligent
waiver of fifth amendment rights after the mandatory warnings. In contrast, where evidence
against the defendant is obtained as a result of the consent of the other party to a conversa-
tion, a waiver of constitutional rights by the defendant is not involved. See United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). Moreover, neither
can the defendant object to the waiver of the other party's rights. See note 195 supra.
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such a definition, the Palazzo, Franks, and Ransom ' decisions flow
more logically from the facts. While the Bonanno "knowledge equals
consent" test ' is logical and persuasive, a final reading on its ac-
ceptance awaits further developments .212
ALTERNATE APPROACHES TO CONSENSUAL INTERCEPTIONS: A
COMPARISON OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Many states have adopted the Title III provisions concerning
consensual interceptions; others have enacted statutes which differ
from those provisions in varying degrees. This section will discuss
the laws of eleven states which have striven for a middle ground
between the broad authority granted by section 2511(2)(c) and
2511(2)(d) of Title III on the one hand and the total prohibition of
the practice on the other. These eleven states will be divided into
two categories: states which permit some consensual interceptions
without a court order while imposing greater restrictions than those
in Title Ill, and states which require a court order as an antecedent
to consensual interceptions.
States Permitting Consensual Interceptions Without a Court Order
California, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, and Michigan
have statutory schemes which are similar in prohibiting consensual
interceptions by private citizens unless all parties to the communi-
2w In Palazzo, Franks, and Ransom, the circumstances of the taping and monitoring in
each case clearly indicated the informer's knowledge that his calls were being taped. See
United States v. Ransom, 515 F.2d 885, 888 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d
25, 30 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); United States v. Palazzo, 488 F.2d 942,
944 (5th Cir. 1974).
21, Law enforcement agencies have employed a variety of methods to establish that an
informer is aware of and consents to the interception of his conversations. Execution by the
informer of an "advice of rights and consent to monitor" form prior to each interception has
been accepted by at least one court as proof of consent. United States v. Bastone, 526 F.2d
971, 977 (7th Cir. 1975). In New York City, the police department's narcotics division regu-
larly has undercover officers and informers record a "heading" on the tape which gives the
date, place, and identity of the officer or informer, a brief description of the anticipated
conversation, and a statement that the officer or informer consents to the recording of the
conversation for use as evidence. Should the Bonanno test win wider and more explicit
acceptance, use of such methods to establish the informer's knowledge of the interception
would virtually assure the admissibility of the intercepted conversation.
"I2 The Bonnano test has been cited approvingly in United States v. McMillan, 508 F.2d
101, 104 n.2 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975), and United States v. Baynes,
400 F. Supp. 285, 292 (E.D. Pa. 1975). In White, it was conceded that the informer knew, at
the time, that interceptions were occurring. The Supreme Court did not rule on the issue of
consent, however, because the circuit court had not reached the issue. United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745, 747 n.1 (1971).
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cation consent, while permitting law enforcement officers or their
agents to utilize the technique with the consent of one participant.
Within this common approach, however, there are significant differ-
ences in the specific statutes.
California's invasion of privacy statute, which predates the
enactment of Title 111,203 prohibits wiretapping2°4 and eavesdropping
on confidential comunications °5 without the consent of all parties.0 6
In the declaration of finding and intent accompanying the statute,
however, the California Legislature stated that it did not intend "to
place greater restraints on the use of listening devices and tech-
niques by law enforcement agencies than existed prior to the effec-
tive date of this chapter. 2 7  The statute also specifies that
"[n]othing in [the invasion of privacy statute] shall be construed
as rendering inadmissible any evidence obtained by .. .[law en-
forcement officials] by means of overhearing or recording any com-
munication which they could lawfully overhear or record prior to"
the enactment of the law.208 Since eavesdropping with the consent
of a party had been a permissible law enforcement technique,"' the
California statute apparently does not restrict police use of consen-
sual interceptions.2 10
Florida's security of communications law21 prohibits intercep-
tions by private persons without the consent of all parties to the
... CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 630-637.2 (West 1970) (originally enacted Act of Aug. 28, 1967,
ch. 1509, § 1, 1967 Cal. Stats. 3584).
10 Id. § 631(a).
"' Id. § 632(a).
2," Id. §§ 631(a), 632(a). Section 633.5, however, apparently allows the recording of a
confidential communication by a party for the "purpose of obtaining evidence reasonably
believed to relate to the commission by another party to such communication of the crime of
extortion, kidnapping, bribery, any felony involving violence against the person, or a violation
of Section 653m, [telephone calls made with intent to annoy] .... . Id. § 633.5. The
section also provides that nothing therein shall be construed as rendering inadmissible in a
prosecution for the above crimes "or any crime in connection therewith, any evidence so
obtained." Id. See generally People v. Ayers, 51 Cal. App. 3d 370, 124 Cal. Rptr. 283 (Ct.
App. 1975).
'"' CAL. PENAL CODE § 630 (West 1970). Consensual interceptions by law enforcement
personnel were and are permitted. See, e.g., People v. Murphy, 8 Cal. 3d 349, 503 P.2d 594,
105 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833 (1973); People v. Dement, 48
Cal. 2d 600, 311 P.2d 505 (1957) (en banc); People v. Carbonie, 48 Cal. App. 3d 679, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 831 (Ct. App. 1975); People v. Standifer, 38 Cal. App. 3d 733, 113 Cal. Rptr. 653 (Ct.
App. 1974).
2" CAL. PENAL CODE § 633 (West 1970).
2, See note 207 supra.
The California Supreme Court, however, has held that in some instances consensual
police interceptions which do not pertain to criminal activity may be prohibited as having a
"chilling effect" on the exercise of first amendment freedoms. See White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d
757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975), discussed in text accompanying note 258 infra.
"I FLA. STAT. § 934.01-.10 (1973 & Supp. 1976).
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communication,2 12 but permits a "law enforcement officer or a per-
son acting under the direction of a law enforcement officer" to inter-
cept a communication with only one party's consent when "the
purpose of such interception is to obtain evidence of a criminal
act. 2 3 Massachusetts, like Florida, permits law enforcement offi-
cials to conduct one-party consensual interceptions but restricts the
practice to "investigation(s) of a designated offense as defined" in
its eavesdropping statute.t  Similarly, Georgia's invasion of privacy
law2' 5 permits consensual interceptions only "in those instances
wherein the message. . . shall constitute the commission of a crime
or is directly in the furtherance of a crime .... ,,2,1 The Georgia
statute has been interpreted as permitting a private citizen, as well
as law enforcement officials, to consensually record conversations
pertaining to criminal activity.21 7
Michigan's eavesdropping statute permits consensual intercep-
tions conducted by "a peace officer or his agent . . . while in the
performance of his duties.' ' 2 's However, that state's supreme court
has ruled that the state constitution requires a search warrant2 '5 in
"participant monitoring" (transmitter) situations, 22 and at least
12 Id. § 934.03(d) (Supp. 1976).
2 Id. § 934.03(c). Interception is lawful under the chapter if made by a "party to the
communication or [if] one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to
such interception. ... Id.
221 MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(B)(4) (West 1970), discussed in Commonwealth
v. Jackson, 349 N.E.2d 337 (Mass. 1976). "Designated offense" is defined as
includ[ing] the following offenses in connection with organized crime as defined
in the preamble: arson, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, extortion,
bribery, burglary, embezzlement, forgery, gaming. . . , intimidation of a witness
or juror, kidnapping, larceny, lending of money or things of value in violation of
the general laws, mayhem, murder, any offense involving the possession or sale of
a narcotic or harmful drug, perjury, prostitution, robbery, subornation of perjury,
any violation of this section, being an accessory to any of the foregoing offenses and
conspiracy or attempt or solicitation to commit any of the foregoing offenses.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(B)(7) (West 1970).
2I GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3001 to 26-3010 (1972 & Supp. 1976).
226 Id. § 26-3006. In Humphrey v. State, 231 Ga. 855, 204 S.E.2d 603, cert. denied, 419
U.S. 839 (1974), the Supreme Court of Georgia interpreted this section as including face-to-
face conversations.
22, See Quaid v. State, 132 Ga. App. 478, 208 S.E.2d 336 (1974).
226 MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 750.539a-.543 (1970).
See id. § 750.539g(a), which provides that the act should not be construed to prohibit
"[elavesdropping or surveillance not otherwise prohibited by law by a peace officer or his
agent of this state or federal government while in the performance of his duties."
21 People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 567, 227 N.W.2d 511, 514, cert. denied, 423 U.S.
878 (1975). Beavers was factually akin to United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
Defendant Beavers contended that he was deprived of his right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures when a police informant was wired and transmitted a conversation
between them to officers waiting outside defendant's apartment building. The court, adop-
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one appellate court has found the same requirement for consensual
interceptions of telephone conversations .221
States Requiring Judicial Authorization of Consensual
Interceptions
Six states-Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, Oregon, Washington,
and Wisconsin-require court orders before conversations can be
consensually intercepted by law enforcement officials and then dis-
closed in court.
Wisconsin imposed this warrant requirement judicially, rather
than legislatively. Its eavesdropping statute,"22 similar in many re-
spects to Title III, regulates consensual interceptions 2 3 with lan-
guage virtually identical to the federal provisions. Yet, Wisconsin's
highest court, reasoning that the statute does not specifically au-
thorize consensual interceptions but only declares them "not unlaw-
ful," ruled that while law enforcement use of this technique for
investigative purposes is permissible, absent a prior court order the
fruits of the interception cannot be introduced into evidence. 24
The status of Maryland law is, to say the least, confused. Its
ting the reasoning of Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in White, found a distinction "be-
tween assuming the risk that communications directed to one party may subsequently be
repeated to others and the simultaneous monitoring of a conversation by the uninvited ear
of a third party functioning in cooperation with one of the participants .... " 393 Mich. at
565, 227 N.W.2d at 515. Significantly, the court emphasized the fact that the conversation
had occurred in defendant's own residence, and declined to comment on situations where the
wired party is an undercover officer, where the participant himself records the conversation,
or where, with the consent of one of the parties, a third person plants a monitoring device in
the area within which the conversation takes place. Id. at 562 n.2, 227 N.W.2d at 514 n.2.
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Beavers since the decision rested on
"adequate state grounds." 423 U.S. 878 (1975). Cf. United States v. Keen, 508 F.2d 986, 988
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975) (Title III's consensual interception provisions
left undisturbed "more rigorous requirements found in state laws").
" People v. Plamondon, 64 Mich. App. 413, 236 N.W.2d 86 (1975). Defendant Plamon-
don was convicted of extortion as a result of his attempt to collect money owed his codefen-
dant by Wagner. Id. at 416, 326 N.W.2d at 86-87. Wagner contacted the police and consented
to the recording of two subsequent phone conversations with the defendant. Id. at 416-17, 236
N.W.2d at 87. Defendant claimed that the recording was a violation of his right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. Citing Beavers, the court applied a very similar
analysis and concluded that the tapes should not have been admitted into evidence. Id. at
419, 425, 236 N.W.2d at 88, 90. Cf. People v. Livingston, 64 Mich. App. 247. 236 N.W.2d 63
(1975).
2n Wis. STAT. § 968.27-.33 (1973).
2m Id. § 968.27(2)(b)-(c).
2' State ex rel. Arnold v. County Court, 51 Wis. 2d 434, 187 N.W.2d 354 (1971). The
Arnold court discerned an intent on the part of the legislature, although it enacted language
identical to Title III, to reach a result which contradicts the one reached by Congress. Id. at
443-44, 187 N.W.2d at 359.
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wiretapping laws225 require a court order unless all parties give prior
consent to the interception of their conversations .2 26 Nonetheless, its
wiretapping statute apparently allows one participant to record the
conversation, but seemingly does not allow that participant to con-
sent to third party monitoring.27 The Maryland eavesdropping
statutes2 8 prohibit the use of a device to overhear or record "words
spoken to or by any person in private conversation without the
knowledge or consent, express or implied, of that other person. ' '229
Provision is made for the issuance of a warrant authorizing the use
of such a device. 0 Additionally, one court has suggested that while
Maryland law may make eavesdropping with the consent of one, but
not all, parties to an oral communication a crime, the fruits of such
monitoring may nonetheless be admissible in a grand jury proceed-
ing since the activity does not involve a constitutional violation and
the legislature, although it outlawed this activity, did not specifi-
cally ban the use of evidence obtained by its use.23
Until recently, Illinois regulated consensual interceptions in an
unusual fashion: the practice was permitted when one party con-
sented and a state's attorney "requested," i.e., authorized, the in-
terception. 2 Effective July 1, 1976, however, amendments to the
law require the equivalent of a Title IlI eavesdropping warrant for
consensual interceptions. 233 Notwithstanding this otherwise abso-
' MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 585 (1976); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-401 to
10-408 (1974).
- MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(a) (1974).
r
m Id.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 125A-125D (1976).
" Id. § 125A(a). In Avery v. State, 15 Md. App. 520, 292 A.2d 728 (Ct. Spec. App. 1972),
appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 977 (1973), this statute was held inapplicable to the recording of
conduct by means of a nonaudio closed circuit television camera.
2" MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 125A(b)-(c) (1976). The application must be by the state's
attorney and on a showing of probable cause to believe that a crime "may be, or is being, or
has been committed" and that "use of the said electronic devices or equipment is necessary
in order to prevent the commission of, or to secure evidence of the commission of such crime."
Id. § 125A(b).
23 Pennington v. State, 19 Md. App. 253, 310 A.2d 817 (Ct. Spec. App. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1019 (1974). The court gave two reasons for its conclusion: First, unlike the
wiretapping law, the eavesdropping statutes make no provision for the exclusion of evidence;
second, there is a traditional bar against judicial review of grand jury action at a defendant's
request. 19 Md. App. at 277-78, 310 A.2d at 830-31.
.Z ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 14-2 (1973) (amended 1976).
m ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 108A-1 to 108A-11 (Supp. 1976). Under the new statutes, an
application to the court must first be authorized by a state's attorney. Id. § 108A-1. A showing
of probable cause must be made. Id. § 108A-4. The technique may be used only in investiga-
tions of felonies. Id. Any order issued expires after a maximum of ten days unless renewed.
Id. § 108A-5(b). Tapes must be sealed after being listened to by the judge who issued the
warrant. Id. § 108A-7. Notice of the interceptions must be given within a specified period
unless a postponement is granted. Id. § 108A-8.
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lute requirement, some flexibility is retained through an emergency
provision which authorizes a nonwarrant, consensual interception if
the officer does not have sufficient time within which to obtain a
court order and "the conversation to be overheard will occur within
a short period of time or the use of the device is necessary for the
protection of the law enforcement official. 234 Even in such a situa-
tion, the approval, if possible, of a state's attorney is necessary, '
and, in all cases, a retroactive application for a court order must be
made within 48 hours. This warrant, in turn, may only issue after
the judge finds both a sufficient showing of probable cause at the
time of the interception and the existence of a statutorily defined
emergency.? If the judge denies the retroactive application for a
warrant, the contents of the intercepted communication are treated
as obtained in violation of the statute. 238
Nevada's regulatory scheme239 is similar to the new Illinois law.
The requirements for one-party consensual interceptions are identi-
cal to those for an ex parte eavesdropping warrant, 24° and an emer-
gency provision permits an interception with the consent of one
party to precede the procurement of a warrant when "it is impracti-
cal to obtain a court order."24' Ratification of the use of the emer-
gency provision must be sought within 72 hours.242
Washington and Oregon are the most restrictive states of the
eleven examined. In Washington, an eavesdropping warrant must
be obtained prior to the interception of any communication, unless
all parties consent.2 3 Moreover, evidence obtained pursuant to such
a warrant is inadmissible except in a criminal action against a de-
fendant charged with a crime which jeopardizes national security.2 4
Additionally, some Washington courts have indicated, in dicta, that
the statutory exclusionary rule may not only suppress the fruits of
an unlawful interception, but also the testimony of any witnesses
who consented to the interceptions of their conversations with an-
Id. § 108A-6 (Supp. 1976).
Id. § 108A-6(a).
n Id. § 108A-6(b).
237 Id,
Id. § 108A-6(c).
21, NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.610-.690 (1973).
210 Compare id., with NEV. REV. STAT. § 179,410-.515 (1973). In State v. Bonds, - Nev.
-, 550 P.2d 409 (1976), the court indicated that consensual interceptions of oral communi-
cations may not be subject to the warrant requirements.
W, NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.620(1) (1973).
122 Id. § 200.620(3).
. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030 (1974).
2 Id. § 9.73.050.
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other, unknowing participant. 4 '
Oregon's laws are almost as restrictive. Protecting oral and wire
communications differently, the Oregon Legislature has declared
that oral communications are protected from interception unless all
parties to the conversation are informed of the interception, 246 or the
conversation to be intercepted is between a law enforcement official
or someone he is directly supervising and a person reasonably be-
lieved to be engaging in a "crime involving narcotics or dangerous
drugs." '247 In the context of wire communications, interceptions are
prohibited unless the consent of at least one participant is ob-
tained.248 Eavesdropping orders permitting interceptions otherwise
proscribed in the oral and wire communications areas are restricted
to investigations of crimes endangering human life or threatening
the national security.249
CONCLUSION
There are four possible resolutions to the questions of whether,
and under what circumstances, law enforcement officials should be
permitted to intercept communications with the knowledge and
consent of one party to the communication: First, to permit the
practice without restriction; second, to permit its use in specified
situations only, e.g., in the investigations of "designated offenses";
third, to permit its use only with a court order; and fourth, to forbid
the practice altogether. The issue is whether the benefits of preserv-
ing accurate and reliable evidence of criminal activity outweigh the
diminution of individual privacy and the possible resultant "chill-
ing effect" on the exercise of first amendment freedoms.
In a perfect society, an absolute ban on the use of consensual
interceptions might be the appropriate choice, for there would be no
need for this technique of obtaining evidence of criminal conduct.
But we live in a society which is plagued by organized criminal
activity, in which whole neighborhoods and communities are de-
stroyed by narcotics traffic, and in which public officials occasion-
ally succumb to bribes or other improper blandishments. The pri-
mary purposes of our system of criminal justice include the
2 See State v. Zuercher, 11 Wash. App. 91, 521 P.2d 1184, 1186-87 (1974) (dicta); State
v. Grant, 9 Wash. App. 260, 267, 511 P.2d 1013, 1018 (1973) (dicta), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
849 (1974).
246 OR. REv. STAT. § 165.540(1)(c) (1975).
211 Id. § 165.540(5)(a).
Z" Id. § 165.540(1)(a).
211 Id. § 133.725(1)(a).
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deterrence of such activity and the protection of society from those
who engage in it. The failure to achieve these purposes constitutes
the gravest imaginable threat to the enjoyment of individual liberty.
"Freedom" and "privacy" are empty words to a person who is afraid
to walk the streets, and would be virtually nonexistent in a society
whose economy and government were controlled by criminal organi-
zations.
Although the problem of crime is societal, the response by the
criminal justice system must be specific, since individual defen-
dants are brought to trial on particularized allegations of unlawful
conduct. "The function of a criminal trial is to seek out and deter-
mine the truth or falsity of the charges brought against the defen-
dant." 210 In the context of an individual trial, the argument against
admitting relevant evidence obtained by consensual interception
amounts to saying that [a defendant] has a constitutional right
to rely on possible flaws in the agent's memory, or to challenge the
agent's credibility without being beset by corroborating evidence
that is not susceptible of impeachment. For no other argument can
justify excluding an accurate version of a conversation that the
agent could testify to from memory.5
The American Bar Association has approved the use of consensual
interceptions because recordings are "the best and most reliable
evidence:"
[W]here informants, whose credibility may be suspect, are used,
where victims of crimes are engaged in key conversations with the
perpetrators themselves, or where the investigators as such are
individually involved and their credibility will be a significant
factor in the subsequent trial, every effort should be made to record
the conversations through the best available means. For a record-
ing will reproduce the very words spoken with all the added signifi-
cance that comes from inflection, emphasis and the other aspects
of oral speech . 52
The existence of a recording of key conversations also minimizes the
possibility "that the informant will change his mind, . . . that
threat or injury will suppress unfavorable evidence and . . . that
cross-examination will confound the testimony."s Additionally,
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963).
211 Id. at 439 (footnote omitted).
52 ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO ELEC-
TRONIC SURVEILLANCE, 126 (1971) (citations omitted) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
"I United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971).
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the use of the technique can help ensure the safety of undercover
officers and informers, and also help protect the innocent against
unfounded accusations based upon fabricated testimony.254
Assuming that law enforcement agencies should be permitted
to utilize consensual interceptions as an investigative and evidence-
gathering technique, the question becomes whether judicial authori-
zation is to be required as a prerequisite to its use. The argument
against warrantless consensual interceptions by law enforcement
officials was expressed eloquently and succinctly by District Judge
Gerhard Gesell in United States v. Kline:25
A Government agent can plant a broadcasting transmitter in a
person's home, car or office without Court approval and transmit
conversation of a consenting informer so long as the informer's
presence is known and accepted by the other occupants even
though they are completely unaware of and indeed affirmatively
misled as to the informer's purpose.
This is an enormously dangerous and insidious power to place
in the unsupervised hands of the public and the police. There are
no restrictions as to time, place or circumstances. Without court
supervision, abuses will continue unchecked. We are becoming a
society that must exist in constant hazard from official snooping.
Whatever incidental good flows from this invasion of privacy is
submerged by the growing appearance of police surveillance so
typical of totalitarian states.21
Another court has melodramatically warned, of "the ominous
spectre of the Orwellian Big Brother."' ?
Unfortunately, law enforcement agencies occasionally indulge
in acts which add fuel to the fire. In Los Angeles, for example, a
professor at the University of California at Los Angeles brought a
suit alleging that the police department had instructed officers to
enroll as students and record lectures, classroom discussions, and
campus organization meetings for "intelligence purposes" not relat-
ing to illegal activity. Chief of Police Davis demurred to the com-
21 No one would seriously urge suppression of a recording establishing, for example, the
defendant's innocence or the existence of entrapment on the basis that the police violated
the law by making the recording.
2 366 F. Supp. 994, 996-97 (D.D.C. 1973).
r' Id.
r' People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 563, 227 N.W.2d 511, 514, cert. denied, 423 U.S.
878 (1975). Both Kline and Beavers involved the use of transmitters rather than tape re-
corders. Several learned jurists find a fundamental distinction between the two. See notes
44-45 supra. The only differences apparent to the author are that recorders tend to be more
reliable and that transmitters are less likely to be discovered and, if found, may enable
monitoring officers to rescue the wearer.
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plaint; the California Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had
alleged a justiciable cause of action, reasoning that the practice
would have a chilling effect on the exercise of first amendment
freedoms. 258
On the other hand, requiring law enforcement officials to obtain
judicial authorization prior to conducting consensual interceptions
would make the procurement of the "best and most reliable evi-
dence" more difficult in every case, legally impossible in some cases,
and frequently more dangerous. The time and energy required to
prepare an application and order, find a judge, and obtain the nec-
essary warrant-all simply to win permission to accurately preserve
an anticipated encounter which itself needs no prior authoriza-
tion-would sorely tax law enforcement resources, which in many
jurisdictions are already stretched dangerously thin. Moreover, in
situations requiring prompt police action, prior judicial approval
could not be obtained. 259 In other cases, legal impossibility would
prevent the procurement of this "best and most reliable evidence."
For instance, law enforcement officials often obtain potentially val-
uable information from an informer whose reliability is uncertain.
Here, consensual interceptions are frequently used to establish the
informer's trustworthiness and to accumulate probable cause to ar-
rest, search, or obtain an ex parte eavesdrop or wiretap warrant.
Adopting a court order prerequisite to consensual interceptions
"would require officers to have probable cause to use a device for
obtaining probable cause."2 As a result, certain transactions like
those involving drugs would require two meetings instead of one:
"the first to establish probable cause, the second to record the con-
versation. ' 2 ' This would prove not only impractical and time con-
suming-there is no assurance that a statement made to an investi-
gator at the "probable cause meeting" will be repeated at a second
meeting-but also dangerous. Organized criminals quickly discover
the problems and procedures of law enforcement agencies2 2 and are
White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975) (en banc).
Ig An emergency provision authorizing retroactive application for and approval of con-
sensual interceptions, as is permitted in Illinois, see text accompanying notes 233-38 supra,
and Nevada, see text accompanying notes 239-42 supra, would ease this problem somewhat.
211 NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAP-
PING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE REPORT 117 (1976) (footnote
omitted) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL WIRETAP COMM'N REPORT].
211 Id. (footnote omitted).
"I "[Narcotics] dealers know what's going on. They read about police work the way
other people read the stock market." N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1975, at 49, col. 5 (remarks of Lt.
Stephen Herrer, Narcotics Division, New York City Police Department).
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likely to become suspicious of someone who repeatedly seeks addi-
tional meetings to discuss what normally would be agreed upon or
transacted at one meeting.
As in the past, law enforcement agencies will, no doubt, adapt
to the procedural requirements imposed upon them by the courts,
the legislatures, and their own hierarchies. However, should the
prerequisites to the use of a particular investigative technique be-
come too time consuming or burdensome, that technique will fall
into disuse.26 3 As the National Wiretap Commission reported, "the
use of consensual surveillance is infrequent" where court authoriza-
tion of consensual interceptions is required.' In such jurisdictions,
"the best and most reliable evidence" is often not obtained because
of the legal and practical difficulties involved, a result foreseen by
the American Bar Association when it recommended that "[tlhe
use of [blectionic surveillance] techniques . . .should be encour-
aged, not discouraged, and they should not be encumbered with
administrative procedure. 265
So long as law enforcement agencies restrict the use of consen-
sUal interceptions to the investigation of criminal activity, there is
little to be gained and much to be lost by requiring prior or subse-
quent court authorization. Legislation restricting the official use of
participant eavesdropping to investigations of criminal conduct
while hopefully unnecessary to protect the privacy of innoceht com-
munications, might serve both the police and the citizenry by clari-
fying the parameters of permissible investigatory practice. But,
beset as we are by criminal activity in so many aspects of our so-
ciety, we cannot afford to erect unnecessary barriers "to relevant
and probative evidence" of crime, evidence "which is also accurate
and reliable." 2"
2 An example will illustrate this point. From 1969 through 1972, narcotics division
police in Manhattan obtained an average of 852 search warrants a year, the overwhelming
majority of which, when executed, resulted in the seizure of the sought-after contraband. In
1973, the police department, reacting to adverse publicity engendered by the Collingswood
raids conducted by federal narcotics agents in the Midwest, imposed rigid prewarrant appli-
cation procedures upon its personnel. These requirements have proved to be so time consum-
ing that in the period from 1973-1975 the number of search warrants sought dropped to fewer
than 75 a year. The practical result is that sizeable quantities of narcotics which the courts
would have authorized the police to seize were left undisturbed by officers unable to comply
with the police department's procedural demands.
21 NATIONAL WIRrTAP COMM'N REPoRT, supra note 260, at 118. It should be noted that
"prosecutors in those jurisdictions did not appear to feel particularly hindered by this require-
ment." Id.
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 252, at 126.
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971).
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The intrusion involved upon the privacy of the average citizen
is minuscule; the importance of such evidence in the fight against
crime is immense.
